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ABSTRACT 
 
Despite the turmoil and instability triggered by the Egyptian Revolution in 2011, the real estate market 
has remained relatively stable. According to the Ministry of Investment, real estate has witnessed a 
noticeable growth “despite political instability”1, and government figures show that the real estate sector 
has become the second largest sector in receipt of public and private investments beginning from the 
financial year (FY) of 2010/2011, with 14% of total investments, a figure that grew by FY of 2011/2012 
to reach 16.3%2. For the following financial years, albeit slowing down in pace, real estate continued to 
be the second largest sector to receive investments3. The research investigates the pursuit of financial 
security through property and land ownership in Egypt, and how it serves as a paradoxical representation 
of Egyptians’ insecurities and fears reflecting the precarious nature of their lives, specifically through 
looking at how housing as a social project has become commodified through the real estate business. This 
thesis looks at the economic and political factors which led to the financialization of people’s lives and in 
turn the dismantling of housing as a social project. What thus becomes the role of the state in producing 
speculation as an aspiration of citizens particularly the professional middle class? I seek to explore the 
question of how this relates to different aspects of social and economic rights. Studying the real estate 
industry and the actors involved and understanding its everyday politics will allow me to understand the 
economy of speculation4 which has come to govern and shape our lives and imaginations, driving urban 
Cairo to become transformed into a market. Looking at the practice of “investing in housing” allows me 
to see the cultural manifestations of economic and political phenomenon which gave way to the 
financialization of people’ lives in the everyday lives of people. 
 
 
  
                                                          
1 Ministry of Investment, (Accessed 2017) 
http://www.gafi.gov.eg/Arabic/Sectors/TargetedSectors/Pages/Real-State.aspx  
2 Central Bank of Egypt, Annual Investments by Economic Sectors 
3 Ibid 
4 Refers to conducting a financial transaction with a significant risk of losing or an expectation of a substantial gain 
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Chapter One 
1.1 An Introduction 
 
Despite the turmoil and instability triggered by the Egyptian Revolution in 2011, the real 
estate market has remained relatively stable. According to the Ministry of Investment, real estate 
has witnessed a noticeable growth “despite political instability”5, and government figures show 
that the real estate sector has become the second largest sector in receipt of public and private 
investments beginning from the financial year (FY) of 2010/2011, with 14% of total investments, 
a figure that grew by FY of 2011/2012 to reach 16.3%6. For the following financial years, albeit 
slowing down in pace, real estate continued to be the second largest sector to receive 
investments7. The Egyptian government has paraded Egypt’s new urban settlements (including 
New Cairo, 6th of October, Shorouk) as the transformative solution to Egypt’s urban problems. 
Boosting economic growth, filling the budget gap through land sales, and solving the housing 
crisis were the main targeted goals leading to the emergence of the new urban settlements8. 
Current President Sisi has announced the construction of Egypt’s new administrative Capital in 
the East of Cairo and declared it to be around the same size of Singapore9. Despite public 
opposition to the project for lacking a social and economic impact assessment, the government 
went ahead with the project and directed 80% of small contractors to work on the project to 
finish it at a record pace10. The CEO of the construction company of the project, Ahmed Zaki 
Abdeen, announced in a recent TV interview that the new capital project is first and foremost an 
investment project11. The metre in the new project is currently sold at EGP 7000 to the investor 
                                                          
5 Ministry of Investment, (Accessed 2017) 
http://www.gafi.gov.eg/Arabic/Sectors/TargetedSectors/Pages/Real-State.aspx  
6 Central Bank of Egypt, Annual Investments by Economic Sectors 
7 Ibid 
8 “Policies of New Urban Settlements in Egypt: An Average effect and a Missing Justice”, Tadamun ( 2016) 
https://tinyurl.com/j6mh53f  
9 “Egypt announced the building of a new capital in the East of Cairo”, BBC Arabic (2015) 
http://www.bbc.com/arabic/business/2015/03/150314_egypt_plan_cairo  
10 “The New Administrative Capital: The Egyptian Economy in Favor of the Army”, Al Araby Al Gadeed (2017) 
 https://tinyurl.com/y8zlnyze  
11 Hona Al Assema, CBC (2017) 
 https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=qLrSvSKBNjI  
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who sells it for EGP 12000 to the citizen12. Cairo has in turn become characterized by massive 
buildings, corporations and gated communities on its outskirts- some of which have been 
described as ghost towns due to the lack of occupants13.  This research investigates the pursuit of 
financial security through property and land ownership in Egypt, and how it serves as a 
paradoxical representation of Egyptians’ insecurities and fears reflecting the precarious nature of 
their lives, specifically through looking at how housing as a social project has become 
commodified through the real estate business.  
This thesis is based on interviews and in-depth conversation with 15 respondents over 
three months in 2017. I attempt to unpack how the real estate industry relates to the political, 
specifically the absence of state care, and how Egypt’s neoliberal ordering has not only 
transfigured the people’s economic lives, but also the way they dream, aspire and negotiate their 
future. How does this affect different segments of the population, particularly income earners 
who aspire to create more monetary value that substantially exceeds what they earn through their 
normal day to day jobs?  By examining the role played by the state in this, I have come to 
understand how real estate becomes equated with development in the national rhetoric, with a 
substantial amount of state investment currently directed towards building roads, gated 
communities and most recently Egypt’s new administrative capital, while conversely turning a 
blind eye towards non-conformity and building irregularities, as well as the deterioration of 
public services in the existing ‘old’ capital. I ask: What are the kinds of conflicts which occur 
between the different factions of capital, for example between the state and the businessmen, 
considering they both compete in their operation as real estate developers? How does property 
purchasing inform understandings of citizenship and what are the relationships of power that 
produce those narratives of citizenship?  
This thesis looks at how housing as a part of real estate has become commoditized, and 
what are the economic and political factors which led to the financialization of people’s lives and 
in turn the dismantling of housing as a social project. I look at the practice of “investing in 
                                                          
12 Fahima Ahmed, “These are the real estate prices in the New Capital”, Al Arabiya (2017) 
https://tinyurl.com/ybtouqkr 
13 “Policies of New Urban Settlements in Egypt: An Average effect and a Missing Justice”, Tadamun ( 2016) 
https://tinyurl.com/j6mh53f 
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housing” which allows me to see the cultural manifestations of economic and political 
phenomenon which gave way to the financialization of people’ lives in the everyday lives of 
people. 
 
1.2 Literature Review 
 
The new urban settlements which were inaugurated by the establishment of the New 
Urban Communities Authority (NUCA) in 1979 were planned to accommodate the housing 
needs of the working poor, particularly those inhabiting informal/unplanned areas in Cairo14. 
Eighteen new cities were created in Egypt, including new towns such as Sadat City, the 10th of 
Ramadan, and satellite cities such as 6th of October. The reality however turned out to be far 
from the envisioned plan, as those new settlements became an attractive site for Cairo’s upper 
middle class, while  low-income citizens, simultaneously, preferred to remain inside their urban 
settlements, which were geographically more suitable for their practical needs.15 In order to 
fulfill the proclaimed goal of those new urban settlements, the New Urban Settlement 
Authority16, built thousands of apartments to house the middle and working poor citizens. 
Nonetheless, urban activists have suggested that the intended beneficiaries were only 
beneficiaries ‘on paper’ and did not actually receive the promised housing units17. 
With real estate promising to deliver quick, easy and guaranteed profits, many have 
resorted to real-estate investment as a safe haven for financial security against inflation and the 
devaluation of the Egyptian pound, beyond the need of merely securing housing18. Following the 
Egyptian revolution in 2011, the government announced looking into enforcing a land tax, which 
                                                          
14 Diane Singerman, Cairo Cosmopolitan: Politics, Culture, and Urban Space in the New Globalized Middle East. 
(American University in Cairo Press 2009):88 
15 “Policies of New Urban Settlements in Egypt: An Average effect and a Missing Justice”, Tadamun (2016) 
https://tinyurl.com/j6mh53f 
16 A government body created to manage the policies and affairs of the New Urban Settlements 
17 Yehia Shawkat, “Policy Note: How not to support the undeserving and Discriminate Against the Poor”, Egyptian 
Initiative for Personal Rights (2014) 
18 “Real Estate in Egypt, To Pay a Pound and find it 20 thousand a year later”, SASA Post (June 2016), 
http://www.sasapost.com/houses-crisis-in-egypt/  
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would end the practice of “land freezing”, which means that land speculation whereby land 
prices plummet with the passing of time to create enormous profits would culminate19. Such an 
announcement did not extend to becoming a semblance for an actual intention even though the 
Ministry of Finance has stated the practice of “land freezing” costs the Egyptian economy 1.8 
billion dollars annually. With the private sector responsible for around 95% of real estate 
investments, their focus is only directed towards the most profitable projects, hence targeting the 
richest 20% of Egyptians- that which leaves the majority of Egyptians facing a substantial 
housing problem20. The state however is the official land owner and is the entity which controls 
the price and area of the land offered to the private sector, which means that there are several 
factors contributing to the crisis.  In 2009, the official count of informal housing stood at the 
housing of 20 million people21, and in 2013, the Minister of Housing stated that around 30% of 
Egypt's housing stock was left unused. Stemming out of an interest to address the housing crisis 
observed in Cairo vis-a-vis the millions of vacant homes and the domineering real estate sector22, 
this research aims to untangle the real estate industry in order to understand the discrepancy of 
impoverishment policies by the state that has pushed the majority of Egyptian into a lower 
socioeconomic income level and conversely, the heightened rate of buying up property. What 
thus becomes the role of the state in producing speculation as an aspiration of citizens 
particularly the professional middle class? I seek to explore the question of how this relates to 
different aspects of social and economic rights. Studying the real estate industry and the actors 
involved and understanding its everyday politics will allow me to understand the economy of 
speculation23 which has come to govern and shape our lives and imaginations, driving urban 
Cairo to become transformed into a market. 
                                                          
19 “The Egyptian Economy looses 1.8 bn dollars annually from land speculation”, (Al Arabiya, July 2011), 
https://www.alarabiya.net/articles/2011/07/06/156363.html  
20 Shahd Essam, “After Weathering the Revolution, Egypt’s real estate sector slows”, Mada Masr (October 2015), 
https://www.madamasr.com/en/2015/10/28/feature/economy/after-weathering-the-revolution-egypts-real-
estate-sector-slows/ 
21 Yehia Shawkat, "The Housing Policy in Egypt: Between the continuation of previous policies and placing fairer 
polici policies for the future.", The Egyptian Initiative for Personal Rights (EIPR) (2014) 
22 Yehia Shawkat, “The New Capital Project is a Real Estate Project” , Mada Masr (2015) 
https://tinyurl.com/haoxdmy  
23 Refers to conducting a financial transaction with a significant risk of losing or an expectation of a substantial gain 
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The total urban housing stock largely exceeds the number of urban households due to the 
fact that since the mid-1980s, the annual growth rate of the urban housing stock has been around 
double that of the urban population, that which also led to a substantial number of housing units 
to remain vacant. In 2005, there was an estimated 6.84 million urban households, whereas 
housing units in urban areas reached a figure close to 9.49 million units leaving 2.64 million 
units vacant or unused.24 A note prepared by the World Bank analyzing Egypt’s housing sector 
posited that in spite of huge investments estimated at  EGP 26.4 billion in direct housing supply 
since mid-1980s, Egypt’s housing crisis is “not a scarcity problem but a result of distortions to 
the housing market caused by an accumulation of ill-conceived and inadequate policies that led 
over time to creating a mismatch between supply and demands”25. With an over-supply of 
housing to the middle and upper market segments, a huge shortage in the supply for working 
poor households26. This consequently left the informal sector to deal with the lack of housing for 
lower-income citizens. The most common way of “dealing” with this condition was through the 
erosion of agricultural land particularly on the peri-urban sites to urban uses, where around 
420,000 hectares (more than one million feddans) where estimated to have been lost to the 
urbanization process which ultimately accommodated populations with high densities, yet 
without providing basic needs or services27. It is worth noting that in the early millennium, there 
was an estimated oversupply of 500,000 units in Greater Cairo’s informal unit count, and a 
sample undertaken in three informal settlements indicated the presence of an oversupply of 15-
20% of the total stock of informal units28.  
Egypt’s housing supply mostly caters to high-end housing. Low and middle-income 
housing supply is currently limited to 150 thousand units annually, creating a deficit of 300 
thousand units, according to statistics by the Housing Ministry29. High-end real estate companies 
hold a market share of around 2000 units per year, confirming assumptions that they contribute 
to the rise in housing prices through deliberately offering a limited number of housing units at 
                                                          
24 World Bank Report, “Analysis of Housing Supply Mechanisms- Final Note”, 2007: vi, 
file:///C:/Users/HP/Downloads/Analysis%20of%20Housing%20Supply%20Mechanisms%20in%20Egypt.pdf  
25 Ibid, vii 
26 Ibid, 1 
27 ibid 
28 Ibid, vii 
29 Ahmed Abdel Aziz, “Egypt: High-end Property ads defy the poverty line”, Huna Sawtak (2014) 
https://hunasotak.com/article/6611  
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every stage forcing demand to remain higher than supply30. A report by CI Capital revealed that 
speculative buying accounted for 25-30% of transactions according to statements by real estate 
CEOs. Sodic, a leading real estate development company for luxury housing has reported its 
strongest earning ever in 2014, with its managing director reporting the company to be “sitting 
on a healthy amount of cash for expansion".31 Nonetheless, the government’s complete 
withdrawal from the housing sector, allowed for a disgruntlement which began to be expressed 
by a wide spectrum of Egyptians reaching the upper middle and the upper classes. Inflation in 
property prices in such a setting has surpassed any rises in income. According to the 
aforementioned report by Arqaam Capital, it is stated that “in the context of wages, we believe 
that residential property is now out of affordable range for the average Cairo resident, but still 
affordable for the mid-high income expatriate residents.”32 Arqaam’s calculation of wages, 
which is premised upon the assumption that the household consists of two income earning 
individuals, suggested that high-income households earn a monthly salary of EGP 30 k, a 
middle-income earns 10-16 K, while a low-income household earns EGP 9 K. Based on that 
calculation, Arqaam concluded that property ownership in general drains Egyptian households 
by 50% of their annual income, whereas a mortgage approval threshold in developed markets 
stands at 30% net of all household debt, indicating such a drain to be extremely high. The report 
concluded that “property prices should not grow much further, and certainly not due to any cost 
push factors such as government land auction prices”.33 According to Numbeo, a crowd-sourced 
cost of living index, Cairo has a house price to income ratio of 11, making it less affordable than 
all Gulf cities including Dubai, which is twice as affordable as Cairo, in addition to all North 
American cities including New York, as well as most Western European capitals. Egypt is thus a 
host to one of the most unequal housing markets in the World34. 
                                                          
30 Mohamed Gad, “Analysis: Economic Reform Raises Housing Costs to Catastrophic Level”, The Built Environment 
Observatory (2017) 
http://marsadomran.info/en/policy_analysis/2017/06/868/ 
31 “Egypt’s Property Market Surprisingly Resilient”, Global Property Guide (2015) 
https://www.globalpropertyguide.com/Middle-East/Egypt/Price-History-Archive/Egypts-property-market-
surprisingly-resilient-127359 
32 MENA Real Estate 2017 Outlook, Arqaam Capital report, 24 
33 ibid 
34 Yehia Shawkat, “Egypt’s Deregulated Property Market: A Crisis of Affordability”, Middle East Institute (2015), 2 
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Following the liberalization of the exchange rate of the Egyptian pound and the resulting 
additional burdens on households due to significant price inflations, and against austerity 
measures undertaken by many families, the housing market projected a strong surge in demand. 
However, this demand is estimated to have largely originated from Egyptians living abroad, 
where currency devaluation has rendered house prices more affordable to them than before, 
which gave for a new round of speculative buying35. In the first half of 2016, Egyptians ranked 
second place among Arabs buying land and real estate in Dubai. A total of 710 Egyptian 
nationals purchased land worth a value of 1.4 billion AED36. This also means that the inflation 
experienced by the housing market was significantly less than that experienced by other 
expenses such as food for example, which in turn shows the extent of the housing market 
irregularity where official inflation statistics were not able to capture housing costs accurately37 
 
1.3 Theoretical Framework 
 
The literature on Cairo’s housing crisis is vast. However, it has mostly tackled Egypt’s 
housing issue using a policy and/or human rights framework, thus lacking a sociological analysis 
that would explain the underlying social dynamics masked by the crisis, and how this crisis was 
produced and is continually reproduced. My interest in looking at the housing crisis is an attempt 
at understanding the larger real estate framework. I look at housing because housing and 
homeownership has gradually taken on a new meaning in a globalized world which cannot be 
separated from the dynamics of a financialized real estate field and struggles over land. Marx 
argues that the nature of human activities has become distorted by money-based exchange that is 
profit-driven, where people labored to produce what could be commodified in exchange for 
money, as oppose to what they needed38. Simmel similarly argues that money has become the 
sole purpose of economic activities39. 
                                                          
35 Mohamed Gad (2017) 
36 “Egyptians top the ranks of Arab investments in Dubai real estate”, Egypt Independent (2016) 
http://www.egyptindependent.com//news/egyptians-top-ranks-arab-investments-dubai-real-estate  
37 ibid 
38 Mary Mellor, “The future of Money: From Financial Crisis to Public Resource” (Pluto Press, 2010):19 
39 Ibid, 21 
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Literature on real estate from the year 2000 onwards, looked at urban production as part 
and parcel of the neoliberal system, what Brenner and Theodore referred to as “actually existing 
neo-liberalism40”. To begin with understanding ‘real estate’, we need to first deconstruct the 
subject of real estate. Fernand Braudel defines economic life through three stages. The first is the 
stage of self-production or self-consumption, where household activities are driven by their 
needs. In this stage, there is no real market as everyone produces for themselves and there is no 
distinction between the producer and the consumer. In the field of properties, this is seen in self-
construction or self-provision activities41, where it was common for people to invest time in the 
construction of the house or building in which they would live42. In the second stage, there is a 
distinction between the producer and consumer, where production here is driven to provide 
services and objects at their market value rather than to accommodate personal needs. In the real 
estate field, ‘professional actors’ appear in the scene, namely brokers and property developers 
who are driven by achieving a profit margin through the difference between the cost of 
production and market price43. The created margin allows the developer to get paid for his work 
as well as create additional profit. The market is usually organized at the local level in the second 
stage, where most individuals or households demand accommodation in the area where they 
work or within a reasonable distance44. 
In the third stage, which is that of capitalism, the actors are seeking profit and are looking 
for a return on their capital investment which far exceeds making a profit margin. This phase is 
also characterized by a completely monetized system on the both the production and 
consumption side, where expenditure is made at a given point in order to secure future revenue.45  
The actors are ‘professional investors’ who aim to reproduce their invested capital.  Here, the 
distinctions between the capitalist, developer and sometimes user do overlap46. ‘Urban rent’, 
which is different than profit is also a characteristic of this phase. Urban rent in this case is “the 
                                                          
40 Neil Brenner and Nik Theodore. “Cities and the Geographies of ‘Actually Existing Neoliberalism.’” Antipode, vol. 
34, no. 3, 2002), 349–379:349 
41 Thierry Theurillat, “The real estate markets: Players, Institutions and Territories”, Urban Studies (2014), 1414-
1433: 1415 
42 Ibid,1419 
43 ibid 
44 Ibid, 1421 
45 Ibid, 1423 
46 ibid 
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result of the general increase in the value of the city”, where the owner of a given place would 
automatically receive higher rent without making any extra investments. Braudel argues this to 
be a social and political issue because it is not legitimate for the owner of the given place to 
become richer47. Braudel divides this stage in two when it comes to the real estate field. There is 
the ‘real’ real estate capitalism which translates into actual physical investments, and there is the 
financialized real estate capitalism which appears in the form of securities that could be listed on 
unlisted and which are not necessarily translated into constructions48. In the ‘real’ capitalism, 
investment is mainly directed at major cities and large properties, and capital comes from 
sources such as real estate funds, investment trusts and domestic or foreign pension funds. The 
2001 economic crisis was a result of the high attractiveness of real estate with the “portfolio-led 
approach”, which essentially diversified and lowered the risks for financial investors, and the 
real estate market was wholly dominated by this purely financial approach which resulted from 
securitization and the emergence of real estate investment vehicles49.  
As an instrument of speculation and a tool of empire, money has come to be linked with 
the unequal distribution of wealth and property wherever it is found50. In order for us to have a 
broader understanding of the effects of capital on urban land development, we need to engage 
with literature on speculation. In its pure sense, speculation describes the process of buying and 
selling which depends on anticipated price increase in place of actual usefulness, quality and 
earning of an asset51. 
Scholars like David Harvey52 and Manuel Castells53 have regarded speculation as a predatory 
practice and as one which is distinct from traditional development54. The following is an excerpt 
on land speculation; 
 
                                                          
47 Ibid, 1422 
48 ibid 
49 Ibid, 1424 
50 Mary Mellor, 20 
51 Edward Glaeser, “A Nation of Gamblers : Real Estate Speculation And American History” (2013):42 
52 David Harvey, “Labor, capital and class struggle around the built environment in advanced capitalist societies”, 
Politics and Society, 265–295 
53 Manuel Castells, “The Urban Question” (MIT Press, 1979) 
54 Ibid, 1047 
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Land speculation has been a source of economic dislocations and social conflict for centuries. 
During periods of economic growth, competition for premium locations drives their price up 
faster than the general rate of growth. As prices rise, more and more people see that a short-term 
profit can be achieved in real estate, and that drives land prices still higher. When real estate is 
thus treated as an investment and held out of use, excessive amounts of construction occurs on 
marginal sites, capital is diverted into speculation rather than production, the banking system 
becomes highly leveraged, and wealth becomes more concentrated55. 
 
Economists however argue that commodity speculation could be beneficial to the market 
system, where its effects potentially include increasing liquidity and improving market 
efficiency56. As a unique factor of production, land could not fit this perspective, as land supply 
is fixed, and land sites are geographically unique, unlike other produced assets. Views which 
postulates land speculation to have destructive influences on urban land markers and the larger 
economy have significantly grown57, yet those theoretical views have not affected the 
speculative boom directed towards land and housing markets and the rapid influx of nascent 
investors58. 
There are two types of purposive speculators who play a role in the process of 
accumulation by dispossession. First, there is the “active entrepreneur” who profits from land 
purchasing and changing property value anticipation, and second is the “structural speculator” 
who profits from actively intervening in government land use investment policies59. Local 
strategies employed by the speculators have become connected to structuralist foundations of 
uneven capitalist development. The term “redlining” is used to refer to investment confined to 
certain urban zones. This practice is linked to the creation of urban inequalities and the practice 
of class-based control over the availability and value of urban land60. Land thus becomes 
commodified through this practice of structural speculation61, which also makes for a pathway 
                                                          
55 Editor's Introduction, Am J Econ Sociol (2014), 627–637.  
56 Benjamin Stanley,“Leveraging Public Land Development Initiatives for Private Gain: The Political Economy of 
Vacant Land Speculation in Phoenix, Arizona”, Urban Affairs Review (2016):563 
57 Ibid, 564 
58 Ibid, 565 
59 John Logan and Harvey Molotch, “Urban Fortunes: The Economy of Place”, Journal of Regional Science (2009): 30 
60 Benjamin Stanley, 565. 
61 Bruce Linderman, “Anatomy of Land Speculation”, Journal of the American Institute of Planners (1976) 
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for capitalizing class-monopoly rents through creating what Harvey has dubbed “fictitious 
capital”62. 
Marx argues that one the essential pillars of capital accumulation is the tendency by 
capital to remove temporal and spatial constraints to realize value, where the goal is to reduce the 
time it costs to sell and produce commodities to a minimum63. In the case of land and housing 
and real estate investment, capital is tied up for long periods in the process of production and 
exchange, and thus the circulation time of capital to return to the capitalist in its enhanced form 
is a long one that could take months and years64. Harvey here describes capitalism as a 
contradictory totality whose ‘crowning glory’ is the creation of a built environment for further 
accumulation65. Capitalist development in this case needs to constantly figure out how to 
negotiate a path between preserving the fixed social structures which stifle profit making, and 
destroying them to create new investment opportunities66. Capitalism thus drives a perpetual 
struggle where a physical landscape appropriate to its own conditions at a certain moment in 
time is built, only to have it destroyed at a later point in time67. 
Harvey links capital accumulation to the structure of urban land markets. He explains that 
the commodification of space is perpetuated through the flow of “productive capital” into a 
spatial fix for capitalist crisis, which is real-estate investment- which forces space to become a 
source of accumulation rather than allow place to function as a source of living68. Harvey 
hypothesizes three “circuits of capital” which “dictate the nature and timing of socioeconomic 
investments in the urban built environment.” The following passage best explains Harvey’s 
hypothesis; 
In the primary circuit, capitalists invest in the production of goods and services, using labor 
power to accumulate economic surpluses. As capitalism is a competitive, uncoordinated process, 
the primary circuit inevitably leads to the overproduction of commodities and the 
“overaccumulation” of capital, such that the opportunities for primary circuit reinvestment are 
inherently fewer than the capital derived as surplus value. This overaccumulation crisis drives 
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investment in the secondary circuit of capital—the spatially fixed land and physical infrastructure 
necessary for primary circuit production. The contrast between capital mobility and spatial 
durability in the secondary circuit represents a central point of tension, as the capitalist 
“production of space” often destroys existing land uses (and use values for local residents) in the 
development process while embedding the validity of exchange-based valuation of property into 
local places.69 
 
The value gains incited by government power and public investment are often what 
determine urban land speculation70 , and looking at space manipulations allow us in turn to 
further deepen our understanding of the state. The process of land speculation thus becomes one 
whereby “individual speculators exploit asymmetries in the political power and cooperative 
coherence of urban regimes”71. The millions of closed apartments signal how it has become a 
game of land ownership and of building homes in speculation that one day they would be in 
demand and that citizens would have the power to purchase them. The thousands of workers who 
become forced to leave their factories once the factories are privatized also display how it is a 
game of making the most profit through using the least possible labor and selling the rest of the 
land particularly if the factory is in a strategic location. This speaks to Julia Elyachar’s work 
Markets of Dispossession in which she argues that accumulation by dispossession is using 
policies such as enforced privatization and structural adjustment programs72.  In this scenario, 
wealth is accumulated in empty lands, vacant real estate properties and unemployment.  Home 
ownership in this context is not the backyard American dream, it is the dream of accumulation. 
The question is how does this affect question of social inequality when dispossession and not 
possession is at the heart of accumulation? 
 
Homeownership throughout the years has taken on an increasingly global prominence in 
politics and welfare policy73, and decent housing took a new meaning which went beyond 
securing an “adequate physical shelter”74. The notion of asset based welfare is no novelty, where 
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it has been increasingly linked with efforts for restructuring welfare states75. Such a direction 
was driven by the conscious need of citizens to take greater responsibility for countering poverty 
risks through property and asset investments given that they increase in value over time, instead 
of relying on social transfers from the state76. With property values and homeownership 
increasing across economically advanced societies, the tied up potential wealth in owner-
occupied housing has been regarded as a valid way out of the fiscal challenges implicated with 
the maintenance of welfare communities, which led to the notion of asset-based welfare to be 
equated or used interchangeably with property based welfare77.  The emergence of this notion 
was also strongly associated with the advent of neo-liberalism and the retrenching of government 
welfare provision78 and the absence of distributive programs, however there is very limited 
evidence to make the case for the functioning of the home ownership structure in place of public 
welfare spending in any way which reduces social inequality79.  On the contrary, it seems it is 
widening socioeconomic classes. 
The takeover of the housing sector by global finance backed by the political force of 
homeownership ideology and by the ‘socialization of credit’ opened up a new frontier for capital 
accumulation80. Homeownership in contemporary capitalism has become deeply entrenched 
within the relentless logic of commodification. This commodification of housing has shifted the 
social project of homeownership for a previous generation to a promise of “private landlordism 
for current generations”81.  Diligent attitudes of saving up to purchase a house and participating 
in saving programs became common ‘middle class’ practices, who focused on gaining access to 
homeownership not investment82.  While homeownership was seen a store of wealth, it was 
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certainly not seen as a source of income83. This transformation was fueled by the adoption of 
neo-liberal policy in the 19080s and 1990s. In the US, the commodification of housing was 
reflected in the conditions for accessing loans for home purchasing which were through 
privileged and protected public finance networks which were often granted preferential tax 
regulations84.  In the absence of supportive government policies, families of young generations 
would most likely need to draw on private financial reserves or take on debt in order to afford 
homes for their children85. Crouch explains that the norm has now become that “instead of 
governments taking on debt to stimulate the economy, individuals did so”86. In the following 
chapters, I seek to untangle some of the issues raised in this section. 
 
1.4 Methodology and Limitations 
 
This is a qualitative research in which my main method was long personal interviews. I 
conducted 15 in depth interviews with property consultants, home owners, citizens who invest in 
real estate and citizens who live in gated communities. I also visited the New Urban 
Communities Authority (NUCA) on numerous occasions and interviewed engineers employed 
by the government. I spoke with liaisons who have been selling and renting apartments for 
decades. I paid several visits to real estate conventions most notably City Scape Convention 
which showcased more than 90 real estate development companies and was visited by 
approximately 17 thousand participants. I contacted property consultants and investors I was 
acquainted with and through them the I met others. My sample was mostly upper middle-class 
Egyptians who actively participate in accumulation by dispossession, either by selling real estate 
or by investing in real estate. 
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I have analyzed the data using the theoretical framework I have provided above, I have 
also used my years of experience working at the Egyptian Center for Social Economic rights to 
contextualize my data to current policy debates on housing and inequality in Egypt. 
The main limitation of my research was population access. Initially, I wanted to talk to 
people living in low income housing who are affected by these policies of privatization and 
accumulation. However, with the worrisome climate for researchers asking questions especially 
pertaining to government policies on housing, I could not find a group of people who would be 
comfortably willing to talk to me and thus I had to resort to the familiar: my immediate circle of 
acquaintances mostly belonging to the upper middle classes. I had wanted to see how different 
people are affected by accumulation: those who accumulate and those who vacate, and I could 
only get the effects of accumulation from secondary sources. This research is not representative 
and not all encompassing, but it offers a slice of the subjective reality of many Egyptians. 
 
1.5 Chapter Overview 
In the introductory chapter, I attempt to set the context for my research in the literature 
review and theoretical frameworks. Through my framework, I try to deconstruct the concept of 
real estate using Braudel’s economic market stages and Harvey’s circuits of capital. I look at 
literature on speculation and land use and relate it with literature on homeownership and how 
homeownership has come to take a new meaning that views the home as a commodity and a 
source of wealth instead of place to live. 
 
In the second chapter, I look at the dynamics between the state and private developers, 
and public perceptions of the housing crisis and who is held responsible for the unrelenting price 
boom. With the neo-liberal turn and the state’s retracted role in housing, the state remains caught 
between its expected role in providing decent, adequate housing for the middle-income 
professionals and the working-class poor, and its own interests in profit accumulation. Thus, 
throughout the chapter, I look at the role of the state in the current housing crisis and more 
broadly in the commodification of housing through analyzing the rental laws and policies from 
the 1950s until the present. I look at the role of cooperatives in housing construction as well, and 
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how they became an attractive site for corruption. In addition to looking at rental laws, I analyze 
the housing policies and the political roots of speculation through providing an overview of the 
policies of Nasser, Sadat and Mubarak. 
In the third chapter, I examine the role of banks both globally and locally in the housing 
crisis through their financing of real estate. Globally, banks shifted their “investment” from 
productive activities to new financial instruments namely the securities market to finance real 
estate. In Egypt, research has shown that during the liberalization of the banking sector, a certain 
‘private sector elite’ was granted access to credit, that which practically highly diminished the 
chances for young entrepreneurs to enter the market. I then look at government efforts promote 
financial inclusion of Egyptian households through encouraging access to credit and reforming 
finance mortgaging. 
In the fourth chapter, I attempt to better understand the financialization of everyday 
practices through looking at my respondents’ perceptions on why they invest in real estate, what 
role do advertisements play, their perceptions on people who buy and sell property for a living, 
and finally what those working in real estate have to say about the field and why they work there. 
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Chapter Two 
2.1 The Legal and Political Frameworks of Housing Policies 
 
In this chapter, I look at the dynamics between the state and private developers, and the 
public perception on the housing crisis and who is held responsible for the unrelenting price 
boom. With the neo-liberal turn and the state’s retracted role in housing, the state remains caught 
between its expected role in providing decent, adequate housing for the middle-income 
professionals and the working-class poor, and its own interests in profit accumulation. Thus, 
throughout the chapter, I look at the role of the state in the current housing crisis and more 
broadly in the commodification of housing through analyzing the rental laws and policies from 
the 1950s until the present. I look at the role of cooperatives in housing construction as well, and 
how they became an attractive site for corruption. In addition to looking at rental laws, I analyze 
housing policies and the political roots of speculation through providing an overview of the 
policies of Nasser, Sadat and Mubarak. 
2.2 Denied Justice Between the State and Private Developers 
 
“We are the reason behind the boom in the metre’s selling price for 5th settlement, we offered Porto New 
Cairo where the ongoing rate was 3-4 K, we offered Porto New Cairo for 13 K per metre and people were 
still buying, everyone followed afterwards”—Dalia, Amer Group for Real Estate 
 There are many stakeholders involved in the land and property game. The two 
essential players are the state and its multi-apparatuses on one hand and the real estate 
developers on the other. Egypt’s neo-liberal turn, was naturally accompanied by the state 
retracting its role as a caregiver and in its welfare provisions, only to become entrenched 
in other ways through becoming an active player in different sectors as a way to  generate 
profit87. I begin this chapter by providing an overview of the current dynamics at play 
between state actors and private developers and the public perceptions around the 
                                                          
87 Julia Elyachar, (2005):167-190 
 
 
 
 
24 
 
housing crisis and where responsibility lies. In the first part of the chapter, I turn to some 
of the interviews I have conducted which provide a quick glance of current state policies 
regarding housing and land management, as well as how they are perceived by people. 
The latter part of the chapter is more theoretical and gives an overview of Egypt’s 
housing and land polices from the 1950s until the present. 
“I used to own a villa in Mohandesin. I bought the land on the day Abdel Nasser died for 
12 EGP a metre. I sold the villa in 2010 for 30k a metre, where the buyer tore it down and 
built a residential tower in its place. We are talking about a time span of 40 years, look at 
all the investments around, nothing would yield you this return on investment rate except 
for drugs”. – Sabbour the President of Al Ahly Co. for Real estate development  
Sabbour continues that in 1974, the government bought a small share of the Semiramis 
Hotel land with a group of Saudi investors, and at the time the government estimated the 
price of the metre for 120 EGP. In 2010, he explains, the land next to Al Ahly Bank in 
Boulaq, which falls along the Nile as well, was sold for 28K per metre.”  
Here I ask, how did such an increase in prices occur, what are the factors and who are the 
stakeholders involved in such an increase? 
Dalia the marketer from Amer Group talks proudly and with confidence about the power 
of the Group in influencing the price of the land, “we know that people will buy no matter what, 
and the 5th settlement was destined to increase in its price”. Realizing the resilience and success 
of the real estate sector, and making use of it being the primary value bank for most Egyptians, 
Amer Group decided to effectively use the logic that its end buyers would “buy anyways”. 
Nonetheless, when real estate employees were asked about their take on the housing issue, none 
of them seemed to make a link between their policies as developers and between the 
unaffordability of houses and the increasing inequalities. For them the housing issue was one to 
the misfortune of the working poor and which was the responsibility of the state, since all of 
them admitted the absence of the state in providing housing for the low income households. 
When asked about housing for middle income clients, Adel the salesman from SODIC, who 
graduated from the American University in Cairo told me, “we are developing a compound for 
the mid-income, but it’s not really mid-income, it’s the for people like us, such as the 
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new compound of New Heliopolis which we are doing in partnership with the army, them 
with the lands, and us with the construction, and in the end we divide profits.” 
In an interview conducted with Fouad, a worker in the New Urban Communities 
Authority (NUCA)88 head office residing in Sheikh Zayed, he explicitly blames the 
developers for the increase in prices, where he explains that the authorities could 
announce a particular land price, but then a developer would buy it for a hundred times 
more to sell it for more. When I asked Mr. Fouad how NUCA would be affected if the 
real estate market fell apart or if a bubble occurred his reply was that the entirety of 
Egypt would be affected because of the position held by the sector in relation to the 
country’s economy. He goes on to say, “Around 70% of Egypt’s houses are vacant, I wish the 
people would stop buying and selling.”  Despite Mr. Fouad blaming the developers for the 
increase in prices, he later on states that there is no economic housing for the people who need it, 
but only social housing which is higher than economic housing. 
 
While in the public consciousness, making profit is what is expected of private 
developers, it is not what is expected of the state, who is still assumed to perform the role 
of the caregiver even though responses from respondents showed that the government is 
perceived to be the main entity responsible for the housing crisis. Despite  seeing that the 
government had only given support to the rich and is the main creator and operator of the  
‘housing black market’, Amina, a local NGO employee residing in Shorouk city, still 
believes that the government “needs to intervene”. Dalia,  who works as a marketer in 
Amer Group similarly sees that the government needs to solve the housing crisis . She 
adds, “they need to construct buildings even if they look ugly but for the people to afford like 
the Asmarat project, Egypt is big and there are vast areas but the that it is responsibile to solve 
the crisis, I attempt to look at how and if the government is capable of between its assumed role 
in providing housing and its own interests for profit making. 
“There is only a sole controller in the preparation of lands for construction which is the state, thus 
we have a scarcity in land, hence real estate prices are increasing in a crazy manner, perhaps if 
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there was competition and there were more entities exhibiting the land, we would see 
different prices”.  
This statement from a recent interview with Sabbour and Maged Sherif the executive 
director of SODIC is contrary to Mr. Fouad’s statement. It indicates that there is perhaps a 
strategic turn in the housing and real estate game that was for years effectively controlled by real 
estate developers, where companies such as Al Maadi, Madinet Nasr, Al Mohandesin for 
development and construction had a stake in the lands through preparing them for construction 
and then pricing them along with the state. This is no longer the case. The government is in fact 
moving to be the main player in the real estate market through being the main controller of land 
prices, “us as developers do not have a say in the price of the metre, they tell me the price 
for x and there is no room for negotiation, we just buy”, adds Sabbour. 
It is interesting to see here how private developers currently blame the state for the 
“unfair” outcome of housing projects, given how private developers are often viewed as 
the evil actors, who for years there were practically the state’s ‘spoiled child’ that 
received anything it wanted. 
 “We would like to address the mid-income, but with today’s government prices 
it is impossible for us to do so”, states Mr. Maged of SODIC. Maged’s statement here is 
in line with Sabbour’s statement about how the state’s sudden assumed the role of private 
developers by offering empty lands to developers with extremely high prices, implying 
that such lands are offered exclusively to high-income groups. 
Historically the state would offer lands at excessively undervalued prices to 
developers who sell at excessively overvalued prices.  The state today decided to take a 
bigger part in the game, where it would keep offering lands, but this time at over -market 
prices, leaving no chance for developers to cater to the middle or lower middle class es (if 
it were in their intent as they claim), yet ensuring enormous profit. When asked about 
social justice and catering to low and middle-income needs, employees who worked for 
private developers automatically pointed at the state as the perpetrator. For years, 
atrocities in housing rights were however committed through the intermarriage process 
between the state and the businessmen particularly in the real estate sector. Frustrations 
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expressed by CEO’s of major devceloper companies only mean that the government is no 
longer willing to share the cake or is determined to get the bigger piece. Egypt’s 2030 
plan announced that 23000 feddans need to be auctioned annually to face the population 
growth, yet only 3000 feddans are auctioned annually by the government 89, which makes 
for a huge gap that is essentially state-driven and which becomes an essential factor in 
the price increase due to the undying demand. 
“There was no competition over the lands in the new capital and the government sold us the land 
for EGP 2700 per metre, how can we address the mid-income with these prices?” asks Sabbour. 
“The tap that opens is the government, yes the government provides land for those who ask for 
it”, interrupts Fadel, a 50 year old broker working in Cairo’s downtown area, when talking about 
the new capital. He continues “ but the price rate for the new capital land is 4000 EGP per metre, 
and that’s only the beginning, who benefits? The policy is the same, the faces are the same, if 
they want to change people’s lives then they need to change their actions.” 
Responses from respondents seem to suggest their mindfulness of the state’s interest in 
profit making more than anything. Amina who lives in one of the social housing schemes sees 
those schemes as a money-making structure for the government. She explains, “The government 
makes a lot of profit off those apartments, and now they collect money from people before they 
begin constructing such as the ‘tahya masr’ project, millions of people placed down payments 
and they don’t even know where the project is.” 
Amina explains that her uncle made down payments for three different government 
projects, one in the city of Shorouk, one in 6th of October and a third in Obour, and they called to 
tell him he received an apt in 6th of October, and has to pay 5K every 3 months. She adds that 
for months he would go and pay without a clue on where his apartment is, “not even which 
neighborhood, no contract or anything, he pays and just receives a cheque through the finance 
mortgage department supervised by the New Settlements Urban Authority”. Amina continues 
that her uncle was later told that he was given an apartment in the cities of Shorouk, Obour and 
6th of October, and that he needs to try with the three until he knows what he will take. “This is 
all money that the government is hoarding, when I bought my apartment here I was told it was 
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going to be in a certain area and I went to look for it but later on found out that it is an entirely 
different place, the whole process is like a lottery.” 
“There is an increasing disconnect between the lived experience of home ownership and its form 
as a financial asset – between the ‘social project’ of home ownership, which dominated much of 
post war political and policy rhetoric and the neoliberal economic project”90. Blinded by the 
belief in a market system that could regulate allocation of housing as a “rational” means for 
distributing resources, public policymaking has all together abandoned the conceptual meaning of 
housing as a social good91. In the neo-liberal context, access to housing meant access to wealth, 
“the value is the possibility of creating more value, which depends on the speed and number of 
transactions capable of generating value appreciation.”92 
 
 The Egyptian government pinpoints property and construction as central drivers for 
reviving its economy. In addition, the government portrays the housing crisis as one of 
production, and in Egypt’s 2030 Sustainable Development Strategy, it establishes a goal of 
constructing 7.5 million homes over the next 15 years. Affordability of the houses was nowhere 
to be seen in the government’s strategy to combat the housing crisis93.  The Egyptian government 
is suggested to be the primary beneficiary and stakeholder of the real estate game given that it is 
the country’s largest landowner where it operates through a myriad of state-owned agencies such 
as the New Urban Communities Authorities (NUCA), which controls around one million feddans 
held for urban use94, thus making the most profit out of land sales would remain its top interest. 
According to a recent report by Arqaam Capital which provides a property outlook on the 
MENA region, it stipulated that land auctions, not demand, are the main source of price growth, 
which the report regards as a government measure to fill budget gaps95. The report continues that 
since 2013, land auction prices have increased by over 50%, reaching the conclusion that “any 
further increase would not be ‘passable’ into residential prices”96. However, the recently 
advocated public-private partnerships which allows the government to take substantial shares 
from real estate projects means that it would remain in the government’s interest to push for 
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policies that would encourage the increase in land prices. The Minister of Housing has 
announced that the government holds a 24% equity share in the new administrative capital 
project97. The Egyptian government recently established the Social Housing Fund with the 
purpose of building subsidized houses. The fund is meant to receive its revenue from the New 
Urban Communities Authorities’ budget surplus, in addition to 1% revenue gained from land 
sales conducted by NUCA. Amendments to the social housing law following the infamous 
Economic conference deleted the article stipulating the receipt of revenue from the NUCA’s 
budget surplus with an alleged reason that it would significantly affect the state’s budget. In 
addition, under the PPP scheme there are no sale of lands, which means that revenue that 
should/could have been transferred to the fund in the form of a tax enforced on land sales is 
essentially lost98. 
 
2.3 Egypt Housing and land Policies from 1950 to the present 
 
In order to understand and properly assess the situation at hand, we need an informed 
understanding of the shifts in housing and land policies through the different periods of Egypt’s 
history. I begin my overview with the 1950s, particularly after the military ascension to power in 
1952. Prior to the 1950s, Egypt’s housing market was to a large extent dominated by foreign 
capital. While urban rent fixing is commonly associated with the Nasserite era, the first rent 
control legislation was in fact enacted in 1947, which in effect froze the rental value at their 1941 
levels in addition to placing a ban on the eviction of tenants by the owners.99. However, in order 
to avoid the discouragement of building new houses, the rent control laws only applied to houses 
built before 1944100. 
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2.3.1 Death of the Rental System                                                  
 The years 1952-1965 were witness to the most drastic of changes in the rent control 
law101. Most literature on Egypt’s housing tend to point to the visible and strong role of the 
Egyptian state in the housing policies as an opportunity to affirm its figure as a centralized 
socialist state102. This policy was also suggested to be a way of guaranteeing the loyalty of the 
urban sector of the local population.  Housing policies during this period targeted the production 
of ‘social housing’ mainly for industrial workers where the housing built was proximate to 
industrial areas such as Helwan. However, this era was mostly signified by the adoption of the 
rent control laws (1952-1962), which continued to freeze the housing rent increase to cover new 
units, and reduced the rent by 25% of the housing value in 1944103. To the detriment of the 
owners, the new laws gave the tenant the right to stay in the rented unit, and the right to bequest 
the unit to third degree relatives- which many considered an act to nationalize the housing sector 
in Egypt104. Despite the positive impact of such an act on ensuring safe tenure for the occupant, it 
gradually led to a discouragement by owners to rent, and thus we begin to see a slow death of the 
rental system and the emergence of a system of private ownership. Another consequence was 
also the regression of the maintenance of the rented properties, as well as the fast deterioration of 
the housing ‘balance’. One of the long-term effects of these policies was the discouragement of 
private owners to maintain their housing stock due to inadequate rent revenue105. In addition, the 
rental housing market witnessed the withdrawal of the private sector, which led ultimately to a 
deficit in the housing stock for the lower-income groups106.  In 1954, subsidized prototypical 
public housing projects were provided by the government to low-income groups in the cities’ 
outskirts, which were built with the aid of public housing development companies such as The 
Bank for Development and Popular Housing, which was established at the time to serve that 
purpose107. Arguably, this encouraged rural-urban migration, while ambiguous maintenance 
responsibilities contributed to rapid housing deterioration, and a one size fits all design that was 
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not compatible with the family size or needs leading to increased densification and poorer living 
conditions108.  With the issuance of the local governance law, this role was later transferred to the 
local councils/authorities109. In line with the government’s policy to nationalize privately owned 
companies, private construction and housing development such as Maadi and Heliopolis were 
nationalized, which allowed for an apparent housing construction expansion in new suburbs such 
as Maadi and Madinet Nasr. 
In 1956, with the aim of shifting capital investments from housing to industrial 
development, annual investments in housing were limited to 30 million EGP, and a 30,000 EGP 
ceiling was imposed as an annual contract to any private company110. Such an act was associated 
with the inception of informal settlements due to major reduction in housing construction costs 
alongside the rapidly growing population111.   
The last of the rent control laws in 1965 effectively forced people to abstain from official 
building, where it stipulated that any individual was allowed to build, but it was up to the state to 
decide the rental value112, while the law placed more emphasis on rent control, it reduced the 
rental value of houses constructed after 1944 by 20%113. The shortage of buildings pushed the 
Ministry of Housing to start building huge prototypical housing blocks, most famously in 
the area of Madinet Nasr in order to rent them out. When the Minister of Housing was 
denied additional money the year after due to insufficient budget allocation, the Ministry 
began to sell the units it had built, which suggests that the onset of property selling was 
led primarily by the state, signaling further the end of the rental system114.  With a looming 
state of war, constructed public housing were less than one third of the previous decade’s.115 
After the 1967 war, the remaining limited financial resources were directed towards the military, 
which meant that public investment in housing and infrastructure were further reduced, which 
augmented for the proliferation of informal settlements. The state constructed emergency 
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housing to accommodate cases affected by earthquakes and temporary demolition of houses, in 
addition to subsidizing construction material and real estate financing116. 
 
2.3.2 The role of cooperatives in the housing market: 
 
The Ministry of Housing had an enormous burden on its hands. Towards the end of 1965, 
presidential decree no. 4415 was issued to determine the responsibilities of the Ministry, where 
its duties would exclusively be in central planning in its own domain, while executive actions 
would be left for the local authorities. One of the responsibilities of the Ministry was to deal with 
the nationalized companies which were divided into four main establishments117.  One of those 
establishments/institutions was The General Egyptian Institution for Housing and Construction. 
It was created through presidential decree no. 4420 for 1965, with the aim of “improving the 
national economy in the domain of construction and cooperative housing”. While formally 
established in 1965, this institution had been gradually developing since 1954 during the 
Nasserite era with the purpose of fulfilling one the 1952 revolution’s goals of encouraging 
cooperatives in Egypt. Since 1954, the government had encouraged the formation of cooperative 
organizations to build houses. This started with the army officers who built what was known as 
the “officers’city” in the Dokki neighborhood near the Agricultural museum118. Other 
cooperatives would be established later by the different professions, which were allocated plots 
of land according to their proximity to the revolutionary command council119 under the rubric of 
the “Endowments City”120. The Ministry of Endowments divided a huge land plot and started 
selling the parcels to each member of the cooperative. At the time, the price range of a metre for 
a piece of land was EGP 2-4, which meant that a 600 meter piece of land was worth less than 
EGP 2000, and which were to be paid in installments over 15 years without interests. The 
cooperatives entered into partnership with the Ministry of Endowments in the land purchase 
contracts, and collectively entered into agreement with the banks to obtain what was known as 
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cooperative loans which came with extremely low interest rates to finance the construction of the 
buildings. 
Starting in the 60s, housing cooperatives proliferated, reaching 154 cooperatives then, 
385 in 1970, jumping to 1500 cooperatives in 1980121.  Many were able to make fortunes through 
the process of collecting savings of the middle class who wanted to improve their housing status. 
In 1981, law 14 was issued to organize this continuously evolving and growing sector122. In 
order to fulfill the housing demands of the middle-class, the government increased the loans to 
housing cooperatives to reach 1200 million during the financial years of 1991/92. Realizing the 
massive burden those loans had on the general budget, the allocated loans decreased to 550 
million in FY 1995/96. The housing cooperative sector became an attractive site for corruption 
and for making unlawful profits123. However, since the government had effectively abandoned 
the rental system to replace it with the ownership system, it remained adamant to subsidize the 
ownership of an apartment through providing easy loans with interest rates less than those 
offered by commercial banks, and the only way to get access to those loans was through 
becoming a part of a cooperative regardless of the financial capability of the family or 
individual124. This approach was described as a “subsidy for the brick” rather than a “subsidy for 
the human being” which should be given to an individual or family after assessing his income 
and social situation125. In the FY 1993/94 and 1994/95 the government incured EGP 780 million 
and 850 million respectively in value to subsidize housing loans for cooperatives126. 
By the mid-eighties, the maximum value of a given loan was EGP 8000, which at the 
time constituted around 80% of the value of the property and was to be repaid over 27 years with 
an interest rate of 4%127. For a number of years, this was an effective system and the installments 
were a reasonable commitment. Over the years, the effectiveness of this system declined due the 
increase in construction costs as well as the shifting needs of the middle class who for example 
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aspired to live in a 120m apartment instead of 90m128. In practice, this meant that given an 
unchanged loan value, a citizen was required to endure a much higher cost for an apartment- a 
luxury that was unbearable by many. This however proved to be of benefit to other households, 
particularly those with “high” savings and who were in close contact with the members of the 
ruling party, in particular the local councils, where the subsidized apartments were given in 
return for campaigning for elections129. 
 
2.3.3 Towards a commodification of the housing market 
 
With the death of Nasser in late September of 1970, Sadat issued two major decrees 
related to the administration of the housing sector. The first was decree no. 2400 for the year 
1971, where the name of the Ministry was changed to become Ministry of Housing and 
Urbanization/Construction. The second decree aimed to re-organize the government body in light 
of the immense increase in the size of companies and activities of the public sector130. 
Housing policies which started by the mid-seventies had successfully increased the 
volume of constructed housing units, which provides substantial work for contractors and 
massive profits in addition to work opportunities for thousands of workers. Four million housing 
units were constructed in a span of 10 years from 1976 to 1986, while the number of families 
formed during the same period was 2.8 million families131. However, by the mid-eighties, 
Egypt’s housing policy could be encapsulated through the phrase “Houses without people and 
people without houses”, where the new policy clearly lacked a social outlook in its 
implementation.132 
After 1975, with the turn to neo-liberal economic policies, the government announced 
that it would only be responsible for the production of social housing, while the private sector 
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would take responsibility for constructing the other units133. However, public housing supply in 
existing cities ceased, and the government redirected its focus towards the new urban 
communities, where the lower-income groups were encouraged to settle, this contributing to 
widening the gap between the demand and supply for affordable housing in the ‘old’ cities and 
exacerbating the scale of informal settlements134. At the same time, support was given to the 
private sector in the formal sector by raising the annual investment ceiling for contracting 
companies to 100,000 then to 500,000 EGP in addition to allowing them to enter into the 
production and trading of some building material along with the public sector135. In addition, 
foreign-owned companies were allowed to bid without a maximum ceiling. The issuance of law 
43 for 1974 gave private sector companies tax exemptions on construction for periods ranging 
from 5-8 years, in addition to further exemptions (10-15 years) for construction in new 
communities and land reclamation projects136. The law successfully attracted foreign and Arab 
investors, that which also caused a sudden increase in land prices due to increased demand on the 
agricultural land within the city’s peripheries137. Capital was invited to invest in real estate 
speculation, and with investors tightening their grip on the land, land became an essential 
commodity138. 
In 1981, new rent laws were introduced with the aim of encouraging the private sector to 
return to the market, and low interest loans were offered to all housing investors139. The new 
Housing Law introduced declared that one-third of all housing units would be put for sale140. 
Rent control was still intact and still kept low, but the above-middle and luxury units were 
exempt from control and newly built units could rent at higher rates under the condition of 
freezing that rate after reaching an agreement141. This led private housing investments to become 
in service of upper income groups for the purpose of evading rent restrictions, while essentially 
forcing the professional middle class and working poor groups to seek out the informal 
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alternative with the lack of affordable housing142.  Fifty thousand housing units in Cairo were 
estimated to be vacant during this period, due to the rigid rent controls143. In addition, investment 
in upper-income housing yielded high investments, which further fueled the lack of interest in 
low-income housing144. Consecutive amendments to rent control laws are suggested to have 
turned Egypt into an “owner-ship oriented system”, where it was almost impossible to enter 
without a sum of upfront payment or what is known as the ‘key money’, which most low and 
middle income groups cannot afford. Conversely, the severely under-priced rent for the fixed 
rent units only allowed for the continuation of absence of property maintenance, the absence of 
private investment as well as minimal property tax revenues145. By the early nineties, the role of 
public sector housing companies saw a significant change. Rather than catering to the needs of 
the low-income citizens, the companies started operating as economic units that rendered profits 
at the forefront of their priorities. Instead of setting the selling price through calculating the cost 
of building and adding a minimal profit margin, the companies would set their selling price 
according to market prices, competing with the private sector, which effectively meant that only 
a certain socio-economic class would afford the housing units, that which exacerbated the 
housing crisis for the low-income families which further legitimized practices such as 
agricultural land erosion and building informal neighborhoods146. 
The eighties, nineties and beginning of the new millennium thus witnessed, the 
liberalization of the housing market. Low-income housing was vastly diminished, even though 
its presence was maintained in a marginal matter, more of a formality147. The state continued to 
support middle income housing which during the nineties focused on youth and the new college 
graduates, with a college degree as a prerequisite. However, with the percentage of college 
graduates from urban slums and informal areas not exceeding 10%, such projects did not reach 
its ‘intended’ target group of the marginalized and most vulnerable. From then onwards, the state 
began to take its irreversible path towards luxury housing- where it would secure land and 
infrastructure for investors- laying the foundation for gated communities, and luxury housing. 
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Despite new cities around Cairo being originally intended to house the low-income households 
and protect agricultural land from informal encroachment, this scheme was re-planned in the 
mid-nineties so that outskirts of Cairo would become areas to host middle and high-income 
housing, and which enjoy the privilege of proximity to Central Cairo148. This was accompanied 
by the state’s withdrawal from its role to providing housing for low-income families149, 
especially with public investments were directed at the new cities with little left for the supply in 
the old cities. In addition, the development of the new cities was unbalanced, where the 
construction was often unaccompanied by proper infrastructure, which left the new homes 
unattractive and as a result unoccupied150. The cost of housing and services in the new cities 
were relatively high and not affordable to the larger majority of Egyptians. Pressure on the 
housing market increased as a result, and at the same time real estate developers shifted their 
focus towards high-end market speculation151. As a result, informal housing markets became the 
illegal albeit unavoidable alternative for low-income popular demand. In the 1990s, popular 
encroachments in illegal settlements were the normal consequence of such state policies and 
priorities which drove public land privatization in favor of the big contractors who constructed 
gated communities along the outskirts of Cairo152.  The advent of the 1990s witnessed real estate 
replacing agriculture as Egypt’s third-largest non-oil investment sector, following tourism and 
manufacturing. However given that most of the tourism investment went into building vacation 
homes and tourist resorts, ie other forms of real estate, it became the largest non-oil investment 
sector153. With most investments directed towards high-end luxury housing, house purchases in a 
significant number of cases reflected a need for investment in an economic asset rather than the 
actual need for a place to live. 
The introduction of the 1996 rent control law had two major consequences. The first was 
the ending of the indefinite passing down of tenure, and the second was the limitation of rent 
contracts to definite time periods while setting zero price constraints154. It was argued that an 
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increase in the rental prices would lead to an increase in the availability of apartments for rent for 
a larger section of citizens who were out of the rental scope155.  Nonetheless, the law offered 
almost no protection to the tenant particularly in tenure security, while the increased rents 
unfavorably hampered the tenant’s household needs namely food, clothing, education, etc.. As a 
result, landowners would set the contract period for a year at a time in order to increase the rental 
value each year, with the right to evict the tenant in case of refusal156.  In addition, foreign 
companies and individuals were allowed to own land and property in Egypt157. 
In 2005, Ministerial decree no. 230 removed restrictions on the allowed built land area 
and the number of units permitted for construction in the coastal areas in the Mediterranean and 
Red Sea. The creation of profits out of selling coastal lands was encouraged to the extent that the 
proceeds of one auction reached EGP1.2 billion158. 
The year 2007 witnessed the deregulation of Egypt’s housing market following the 
Ministerial decree 350/2007 which practically eliminated all restrictions on foreign companies 
and individuals purchasing properties in Egypt with the exception of Sinai159. Between 2007 and 
2011, land prices jolted up by 148% per year in Cairo’s new urban settlements, and by 44% per 
year in prime locations in the heart of Cairo160. Similarly, the past eight years also saw a jump in 
prices of social housing where they had increased by 14% per year, while average incomes 
increased by merely 1% during the same period161. At the eve of Egypt’s Economic Conference 
in March of 2015, further steps were taken on the deregulation front , whereas the last remaining 
restrictions on foreign ownership of land and property in Egypt were removed through the new 
Investment law no. 17 for the year 2015. According to the law, the government could assign 
state-owned land to the private sector to engage in private-public partnerships schemes for free. 
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In 2017, more amendments to the law allowed foreigners to receive Egyptian residency of one or 
five years if they buy real estate worth $ 100K (raising it from 50K) or 400K, respectively. 
 
2.4 The political roots of speculation 
 
In 1957, the government proclaimed there to be two separate types of state-lands, which 
are public lands and state-owned land which is subject to control by governmental institutions162. 
State-owned companies were thus allowed to use the state-owned lands for their own 
commercial purposes. The law paved the road to restrict people from land ownership through 
limitation163 and lands owned through limitation starting in 1942 (15 years before the issuance of 
the law) became illegally owned, unless legal ownership documents were provided. In addition, 
“state-owned lands” became a commodity, where public companies and institutions were granted 
the right to act upon them as they wish if they made profit out of it for their own use164. 
With most of Egypt’s land state owned, it is difficult to argue against a depoliticized real 
estate market in Egypt. While the onset of Egypt’s housing issues and informal settlements 
are usually linked to Sadat and Mubarak’s neo-liberal economic policies, I however 
suggest it to be a reflection of Egypt’s exclusionary pratices post 1952. In fact, Dorman 
explains that the desert cities initiatives and the ‘edifice projects’ of the 1960s such as the 
High Dam and the Tahrir Province were all part of the Nasserist building project which 
served as symbols of legitimacy for the Nasserite government and as a means of 
distributing patronage165. Waterbury argues that such edifice projects were made to skip 
state-society negotiations by Egypt’s rulers through transforming the Egyptian society 
without actually engaging it166.  
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It is imperative here to look at military housing and control of land which dates to 
the Nasserite era and was supported by Sadat as a way of garnering the political support 
of the armed forces167. Land holdings in the Western and Eastern deserts of Egypt by the 
Defense Ministry were a result of a policy of dispersing bases and facilities during the 
1973 war with Israel168. After the war, focus was directed towards post-war 
reconstruction as mentioned earlier. Military controlled areas became a valuable land 
bank for the military, and military organizations such as the Armed Forces Land Projects 
helped in constituting this land bank, in addition to valuable properties which the military 
acquired by force majeure169. Egyptian land became a “kind of multi-purpose capital: 
enabling ‘joint ventures with public sector and private developers’ and thus ‘forging linkages 
with strategic elites.170” 
 
As soon as the 1973 war had ended, Sadat announced the appointment of Othman Ahmed 
Othman founder of the Arab Contractors Co. as Minister of Housing and Construction171. Under 
Othman, the new functions of the Ministry would include urban planning, housing, construction, 
urbanization, and infrastructure. In his book “Housing and Policy”, Milad Hanna notes that at the 
time the private sector was mentioned for the first time on equal grounds with the public sector 
which was an indicator of the new political and economic stance of the state172. The new 
government in addition, regained its control over housing in Egypt’s governorates after a period 
of decentralization and control by their respective governors. Hanna describes this era as the era 
of the contractors’ dominance, where Othman became in total control of the housing and 
construction sector173. 
Othman’s first act was the privatization of the contracting sector.  He issued a decree to 
annul the state policy of exclusively giving contracting operations that exceed EGP 500 thousand 
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in value to public sector companies, which paved the way to the creation of new companies that 
would become active in real estate investment. Public sector companies were thus faced by a 
strong competition from private sector companies, which were formed by the second generation 
of those whose companies were nationalized, hence companies like Sons of Othman, Sons of 
Allam, Sons of Durra, Sons of Adly Ayoub and the Sawiris appeared174. By 1976, with the 
liberalization of the contracting sector, public sector companies became a burden on the state 
budget as they were forced to borrow from banks with high interest rates to perform projects that 
were directly assigned to them by the government, but which the government could not pay for. 
State owned companies such as the infamous Arab Contractors Co. and Al Nasr Co. went 
bankrupt long before the liberalization of the sector175. 
In 1976, Minister Othman occasionally delivered speeches from the podium of the 
people’s assembly in a sign of his power. In one of his speeches, he announced there to be a 
deficit of one million housing units which created the housing crisis. The figure presented by 
Othman was amended three years in a report by a national research team which raised the deficit 
to 3.6 million housing units. However, the initial figure presented by Othman had essentially 
flattened the problem, since it lacked any form of analysis such as which type of housing mostly 
incurred the deficit, etc…. Othman’s speech serves here as a marker of a historical moment 
which gave power to the ‘new capitalists’ who began their ‘trade’ in land speculation. It also 
gave rise to importers of construction material, ultimately creating a noticeable imbalance in 
Egypt’s housing dynamics176. In the mid-seventies the price of the square meter ranged from 
EGP 40-80 depending on its location. With the direction of Othman’s policies coming into 
shape, prices witnessed a gradual increase until the price of the meter reached EGP 1000 in 1985. 
In 1995, the range of the metre had reached EGP 7000-10000 in prime locations177. Recognizing 
the growing importance of well-located lands as a valuable unrenewable economic commodity, a 
strong urge appeared from businessmen to tear down old buildings to replace them by towers, 
business or residential. This was also met by a tremendous rise in the price of construction 
material. The price of a ton of cement sold for EGP 6-7 until the end of the sixties, rose to EGP 
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30 in the early seventies, then to EGP 200 in the early nineties. In the same period reinforcing 
steel rose from EGP 60 to 1200178. 
In a move to constitutionalize their hegemony, the Syndicate of Engineers led at the time 
by Othman himself, decided to form a separate entity for building and construction contractors 
which was to be issued through a separate decree from the “people’s council”. The new entity 
would allow the big names of the industry to impose taxes and percentages from the value of the 
smaller contractors’ own projects through which they would fund the different companies, thus 
in a way acting like a bank. The “entity” would also “sort” the contractors into categories upon 
which would be decided what projects they would be allowed to bid for179. Despite oppositions 
from the then Prime Minister who foresaw the kind of political and economic power this entity 
would give to contractors, the decree was passed and the entity was formed in 1992180. 
With Cairo becoming a 10 million plus megacity, the governments of Sadat and 
Mubarak sought to attract this growth away from the capital, which was primarily 
centered on Egypt’s agricultural lands. As a result , foreign funding was pursued for the 
building of ‘new cities’, an idea that was dismissed as uneconomic by major donors such 
as the USAID and the World Bank, who instead proposed that the informal urbanization 
needed to be channeled to the state-owned desert periphery181. Such a proposal however 
was an impediment to the already-existing plan by the elite monopoly to base formal 
urbanization and construction on those peripheries- that which led the government to 
reject the donors’ proposals182. The term ‘elite’ here includes “multiple categories of 
influence and privilege. It includes senior officials in the housing ministry and its various 
agencies, as well as the public- and private-sector contractors who depended on their 
contracts”183. In 1974, Sadat went ahead with the plan and announced the construction of 
new desert cities to become Egypt’s main urban development policy184. The ‘new town’ 
practice acted as a “panacea”, whereby it would serve as a leeway to ignoring the 
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growing complexities of the existing capital in favor of an alternative unilateral urban 
solution185. Dorman describes this alternative urbanism as an “exercise for elite 
urbanism”, rather than an actual solution to problems it was meant to address 186. The new 
towns had proven extremely expensive for the state and were dubbed as ghost towns in 
the Egyptian press187. Instead of allowing those new cities to be accessible to ordinary 
(working poor professional middle class) Egyptians through permitting large-scale 
construction of semi-formal owner built neighborhoods, they became a major attraction 
for upper-income Egyptians for speculative property investments. For example, land in 
the 10th of Ramadan city was allotted to businessmen with connections to the ruling 
party188. In addition, housing in the new towns were regarded as inferior, with most job 
opportunities far away from them, and with the lack of basic amenities such as shops and 
essential services. 
In the early 1980s, defense Minister Abdel Haliem Abu Ghazala expanded the 
military housing program whereby all retired soldiers would have their own flats by 
1986189. From 1985 to 1986, 5% of all housing constructed in Egypt was by and for the military. 
By the mid-1980s, the military had occupied about 128 km2 in Cairo, and around half the 
metropolitan area at that time190.  The defense Ministry was an immediate driver in Egypt’s 
property boom. In 1986, the Ministry announced its desert-cities program that was going to be 
funded by the sale of military land in Cairo and other large cities191.  The Ministry also began the 
sale of land in military cities to citizens who wanted to escape the congested life of the Nile 
Valley and reside in the desert. Other sites were however retained by the armed forces and 
security agencies for “future urban development that will generate huge profits for developers, 
whether private or government”.192 It is suggested that the Egyptian military’s parallel economy 
was linked to Mubarak’s efforts to depoliticize the officer corps in the 1980s followed by the 
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removal of Minister Abu Ghazala, his suspected rival in the 1989193.  Despite the diminished 
visibility of the military in the Egyptian public life by the early 1990s, it has maintained its 
behind the scenes influence particularly with its ownership of substantial assets in land, labor and 
capital194. 
 
Egypt’s desert boom is a reflection of consistent configurations of speculation, 
whereby the politically connected businessmen would be allotted serviced land at 
unreasonably cheap prices, which they would use to build luxurious housing and sell 
them off at a premium195.  Real estate speculation was an essential form of “elite 
aggrandizement” since the 1970s. While in some cases state officials turned a blind eye 
to the public and private misuse of land, in other cases state agencies themselves were the 
ones leading the appropriation, often in the name of ‘land reclamation’ 196. Periodic 
bankruptcies and high-profile scandals by major developers reflect the speculative and 
patronage-driven character of the whole process. Muabarak’s overthrow in 2011 was 
heavily enmeshed in the elite corruption related to this process 197. For instance, in 2005 
during the reign of Housing Minister Ahmed Al Maghraby, 33.6 million metres were sold 
through direct sales by NUCA to the Hesham Talaat Moustafa Group for 297 EGP/metre 
to be paid over a period of 20-25 years in addition to their acquisition of 800 feddans by 
pre-emption198.  This deal would later culminate into the Madinaty project. In the same 
year, 26 thousand feddans were sold also through direct sales in the ‘Ayat area to the 
Egyptian Kuwaiti Co. for 200 EGP/feddan which is worth approximately 7 millimes for 
the metre, to be utilized for agricultural reclamation199. Several months later, and before 
paying the price of the land in full to the government, the Co. resold the land for 100 
thousand per feddan to another Kuwaiti Co. called “The International Group for Real 
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Estate Companies” as land to be used for luxury housing200. In 2006, 500 feddans were 
sold to the Palm Hills Group for 250 EGP/metre to be utilized as luxury housing. 201 
Looking at the company documents, we get to see how enmeshed the members of the 
government and the board of the company were. The Mansour-Maghrabi Co. which was 
owned by the then Housing Minister Ahmed Al Maghraby who was also the head of 
NUCA at the time, as well as Mohamed Mansour, the former Minister of transport, 
owned 55% of the company’s stocks. Over and above, Alaa Mubarak, owned 24 mi llion 
stocks where he listed himself as Alaa Mohamed Hosny Al Sayed in order to conceal his 
involvement in such a corrupt deal202. The company’s stakeholders also included Gamal 
Mubarak’s brother in law as well as the son of the Minister of Foreign Affairs 203. 
 
‘Land monetization’ has become a common practice of governments, where the 
increase in land price driven by government powers of land management, allows state 
actors increased control over urban spatial change204.  This control becomes embodied in 
the extension of state power either through taking the revenue from the development of 
the land for the government, or through guaranteeing the support of the powerful 
corporate state backers through distributing revenues of land development 205. Gavin 
Shatkin introduces the concept of a ‘real estate turn in urban politics and policy’, which 
he aligns with the rise of ‘speculative urbanism’ that is characterized by a turn towards 
developing ‘world build environments’ through enabling corporate land speculation 206. 
This also falls within Harvey’s theorization for the over accumulation of capital, where in 
tendencies of crisis, increased investment in the ‘secondary circuit’ of capital occurs, 
which means investing in the built environment207.  Timothy Mitchell argues that the neo-
liberal program did not remove the state from the market, nor remove public subsidies, 
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but argued instead that they belonged to the imagination208. He explains that the main 
impact of the neo-liberal program was the allocation of public funds into fewer and 
different hands. “The state turned resources away from agriculture and industry and the 
underlying problems of training and employment. It now subsidized financiers instead of 
factories, cement kilns instead of bakeries, speculators instead of schools.” 209 
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Chapter Three 
 
3.1 The role of banks and access to credit 
 
In this chapter I look at the role of banks both globally and locally in the housing crisis 
through their financing of real estate. Globally, banks shifted their “investment” from productive 
activities to new financial instruments namely the securities market to finance real estate. In 
Egypt, research conducted has shown that during the liberalization of the banking sector a certain 
‘private sector elite’ was granted access to credit, which practically diminished the chances for 
young entrepreneurs to enter the market. I then look at the efforts by the government to promote 
financial inclusion of Egyptian households through encouraging access to credit and reform of 
finance mortgaging. 
 
3.2 The Global Credit Crunch 
 
Taking the example of housing, it is very clear that not only was the state never absent but, more 
than that, it has always played a central role in the process of commodification and 
financialization. Public or semi-public banks across the world slowly diverted their public funds 
from aide-à-la-pierre (financing public or semi-public social housing builders) to aide-à-la-
personne (subsidizing the consumption of market-produced houses)210. 
 
According to the social theory of money, all money is credit to the holder and a debt on 
society211. Money is mostly created through bank credit or what becomes called debt-based 
money212.  No sector of the current society is excluded from debt involvement, including the 
government, industry, individuals, households and the financial sector. The housing boom in the 
US and the UK was fueled by borrowing for financial speculation through mortgage and 
personal debts leading to a massive credit crunch.213 The issuing of money through a privately-
owned banking system also meant that the direction of money use was no longer in the hands of 
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the public sector but by those who take on the debt. Money is created through taking on debt 
through loans offered by the banks which enabled capitalist expansion214. Capitalism would fall 
if everyone paid their debts or if debts were no longer taken. Unlike state-issued money or what 
is known as ‘fiat’ money, money issued by banks needs to be repaid with interest. “Credit 
creation became the actual business of banking”, without which they could not carry on their 
business215. The bank credit creation system had thus been catering to the demands of 
speculative inflation rather than to the needs of production. A substantial change in the banking 
system was the circulation of money through the money market instead of the banking system. 
Banks, particularly investment banks began to sell the debts they were issuing as an asset for 
investment as a ‘security’ where they would have more ready cash for business expansion216.  
The buying of debt ultimately became the fastest growing business on Wall Street217. Over and 
above, the growing promotion of homeownership coupled by a house price boom that seemed 
unending led to a massive expansion of mortgage debt in the US. By 2006, the banking system 
which has become reliant on securing a constant money flow through the money markets was 
only investing in the new financial instruments rather than productive activities218.  Lending for 
finance real estate and household purposes replaced “productive” lending as a driving force in 
the loan portfolio of banks219. The 2007 financial crisis was caused by a halt in lending between 
banks because they had ceased to believe in the financial products there were exchanging, thus 
no longer believed in the functionality of the banks themselves. 
 
3.3 Banking and the making of the elite monopoly in Egypt 
 
In the early 1960s, Nasser nationalized the Egyptian banking sector which encompassed 
four public banks which were the National Bank of Egypt, Banque Misr, Banque du Caire and 
Bank of Alexandria. The four banks were responsible for exclusively channeling financial 
                                                          
214 Ibid, 27 
215 Ibid, 37 
216 Ibid, 47 
217 Ibid, 48 
218 Ibid, 50 
219 Mauel Aalbers, “The Variegated Financialization of Housing.” International Journal of Urban and Regional 
Research (2017):4 
 
 
 
 
49 
 
resources to developing the public sector under the supervision of the Central Bank of Egypt220.  
Under Sadat, the adoption of an open-door policy freed the path for establishing joint ventures 
between foreign and public banks granted a national stake of a minimum of 51%221. However, 
the newly formed banks did not perform well in their roles as financial intermediators, in 
addition to their balance sheets being burdened with what is known as non-performing loans 
which were loans in default or about to become in default222. With the undertaking of economic 
liberalization through structural adjustment programs in 1991, Egypt’s banks’ lending and 
deposit rates were liberalized, and credit ceilings for the private and public sector were 
abolished223.  In 1992, law 95 was issued to regulate the issuance of security and dealings as well 
as the companies working in the securities field with the aim of reviving an inactive capital 
market. Restructuring of the banking system was the other main aspect of the reform process. 
This restructuring entailed a significant reduction in the public ownership of banks to “enhance 
the market mechanism”224. The joint venture banks were forcefully privatized through reducing 
the share of the four public banks in those ventures by less than 20 percent, as well as allowing 
foreign ownership by more than 49 percent. Further, the abolishment of credit ceilings 
remarkably increased the credit supply to the private sector. The World Bank claims that the 
private sector as a share of GDP increased from 29% to 54% in the period between 1990 and 
2003225. Non-performing loans, however, still constituted more than 24% of loans in 2003 and 
the capital market failed in becoming an alternative tool for corporate financing226. Against rising 
inflation, high unemployment rates and a growing domestic debt, the free floatation of the 
Egyptian pound was announced by the government in 2003. A few months after, in July of the 
same year, a new banking law was passed with the aim of merging the banking industry through 
“reducing the numbers of banks, privatizing the remainder of the joint venture banks along with 
one or more of the public-sector banks”227.  The effect of the law on the banking sector was quite 
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visible. The number of banks controlled by foreign companies reached 15 banks in 2008 as 
opposed to five in 2004 and two in the early 90s228. In addition, the market share of privately 
controlled banks increased from around 20% in 2004 to more than 50% in 2008. The share of 
non-performing loans on the banks’ balance sheets witnessed significant decline, yet not 
sufficient enough to improve credit supply229. 
 
The economic development of the business private sector was an essential outcome of the 
structural adjustment process, not only through the privatization of public enterprises, but also 
largely through the opening of new sectors for private investment that were formerly labelled as 
strategic such as steel and telecommunications230. 
 
Access to finance was most certainly an essential factor in making profit of those 
opportunities. It is argued that Egypt’s current supreme economic figures were granted access to 
finance due to their political connections rather than economic rationality which at the  time 
made it impossible for young new entrepreneurs to start businesses231.  Complaints by small and 
medium enterprises for not getting access to credit is in fact highly contradictory to the high 
increase of credit supply to the private sector stimulated by the reforms in the banking sector, 
and statistics reveal that in 2000 only 10% of the financing needs of micro and SMEs were 
met232. In an analysis of the Egyptian banking sector it was revealed that 42 percent of the 
overall credit facilities to the private sector was distributed to a mere 343 clients, 28 of which 
received 13% of the overall credit233, as well as two borrowers owning loans worth more than the 
bank’s capital base234.  In addition to the unrestricted credit access, the government decided to 
settle the non-performing loans (NPLs) despite a history of ignoring the problem since the 
1990s235. In 2004, a new law was issued that allowed the “central bank” to make out-of-court 
settlements and created a new unit at the CBE for dealing with NPLs and mediating between 
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banks and debtors. Over 5000 loan default cases were investigated at the time, 250 of which 
entailed amounts more than EGP 50 million236. An excluded public from the out-of-courts 
settlements exacerbated the already existing problem of lack of transparency regarding credit 
supply which started in the 1990s, consequently making it an impossible matter to prove if the 
‘examined’ businessmen were really insolvent or simply holding large private assets237.  At the 
time, the forging of strategic alliances between private banks and Egyptian local business 
families began to form. In 2006, the El-Mansour and El-Maghraby Investment and Development 
(MMID)238 bought the Egyptian American Bank.  This was followed by a joint venture with the 
French Bank Credit Agricole239 where MMID held a share of more than 20%. The significance 
of this venture was later exposed when the French Bank swiftly expanded into the field of 
mortgage financing to directly support the growing business activities of the families in the 
Egyptian real estate market240. 
 
3.3 Towards financial inclusion and a homeownership society 
 
          In Egypt, ‘experts’ express their worry that a country with a population of over 90 million 
has only 10-13% of its population with bank accounts241. In April of 2017, the Central Bank of 
Egypt held the “Arab week for financial inclusion”, with the aim of bringing the maximum 
possible number of companies and individuals under the banking system umbrella, which would 
according to an economic expert, “spur economic development”242. In the same month, the 
Egyptian Banking Institute celebrated the Global Money Week through an initiative titled 
“Shaping the Future” which targeted achieving financial literacy for 1.5 million children and 
youth across 27 governorates243. Activities of the Global Money Week included university 
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students visiting a number of Egyptian Banks as well as the Egyptian Stock Exchange. Public 
primary, preparatory and secondary schools were also spaces where financial awareness sessions 
took place. The Egyptian Banking Institute (EBI) also partnered with the Ministry of Youth and 
Sports and the Egyptian Stock Exchange to host a stock exchange simulation game for children, 
where the winner would receive prizes from Banque Misr244. Later in 2017, presidential decree 
no 89 was issued for the establishment of the ‘Egyptian Council for Payments” which would 
serve as a body to guide Egypt to become a cashless economy245. The council in principle aims 
to transform the country’s economy into a digital one through expanding digital payments to 
reduce the share of informal financial transactions. The council is headed by the Egyptian 
President and its members include the Prime Minister, the Central Bank’s governor, Ministers of 
Defense, Planning, Interior, Justice, Finance, Communications, and head of the Secret 
Services246. One of the first decisions announced by the council was the introduction of mobile 
payment services and financial transactions. To promote this, citizens were exempted from the 
fees required to open accounts for mobile payments for a year. 
                In Egypt, savings instruments, most commonly postal savings, are more common than 
credit247. Among the literate and illiterate, postal savings are almost twice as prevalent as bank 
savings248. The securities market as a source of financing investment is quite limited, and there a 
few non-bank real estate lending companies offering mortgage loans249. For real estate 
investment or purchasing, the most common financing method is offered by the developer 
through a deferred installment arrangement where the developer receives a small down payment 
usually amounting to 10% of the unit’s price, which is followed by installments over 4-8 years 
and in some cases 10 years. The unit becomes officially in the name of buyer upon payment of 
the final installment250. Developers eager to sell their units and schemes that offer paying in 
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installments have become common amongst developers with projects on Cairo’s outskirts, where 
it is estimated that 80-90% of new homes today are bought in installments251. 
3.3.1 Finance Mortgaging in Egypt 
 
                In 2001, the real estate law or Mortgage Law no. 148 was issued in an attempt to 
resolve the unaffordability of housing in Egypt. While designed to provide affordable long-term 
allocation for property purchase (up to 90% of the value of the unit) and the building and 
renovation of real estate, the law as any mortgage law allowed banks to repossess properties and 
evict tenants who default252. In what would be called a foreclosure sale, a property would be sold 
in a public auction in the event of a default253. Amendments to the law occurred to appease 
religious authorities who did forbid the law according to their interpretation of  Islam because it 
was based on ‘riba’ or usury. Amendments were done to the terminology were the term 
‘interests’ was replaced by ‘installments’254. Back then, experts at the Housing and Development 
Bank had stated that the private sector monopoly on the housing sector had led properties to be 
overpriced, and that the introduced mortgage law would “make real estate more affordable for 
the population”255. Nonetheless, on the account of lack of land and with only 10% of urban units 
registered, the mortgage market was unable to develop256. 
               Over the past few years, the Egyptian government has been trying to make some 
reforms to create an enabling environment for a proper mortgage finance market. Some of these 
reforms include creating system for registering property, reducing fees for property registration 
and setting legal foundations for establishing foreclosure procedures, in addition to allowing 
private sector financial institutions to securitize mortgages257.  A report by the World Bank in 
2013 indicated that the value of market-based home loans jumped from EGP 300m ($42.8m) in 
2006 to EGP 4.5bn ($642.3m) in 2011, while during the same period, the number of mortgage 
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finance companies grew from two to 12258. Despite this significant increase, the Egyptian 
mortgage market is still considered to be under-developed, where the value of outstanding 
mortgages was less than 1% of the GDP, whereas for OECD countries the value was between 
30% and 90%259. In 2014, the government announced that further easing of mortgage restrictions 
was an essential step towards accessibility of low-cost housing. In the same year, the Central 
Bank of Egypt (CBE) re-launched the initiative with interests starting from 7% to the low 
income and 8% to the middle-income groups. Nonetheless, the lack of property registration was 
once again an impediment to the spread of the process. Under the initiative, housing for the 
middle income needed to not exceed EGP 500 thousand. However, units directed towards the 
middle income often exceeded this value, particularly after the devaluation of the Egyptian 
pound260. 
                 In 2017, the CBE re-proposed the initiative and launched a large media campaign to 
once again promote the finance mortgage initiative, which would increase the allocated amount 
for mortgage financing for the low and middle-income households from EGP 10 million to 20 
million.   The maximum stipulated income for a middle-income individual was EGP 10 thousand 
and EGP 14 thousand for a family261. The Minister of Investment had announced that those 
reforms had led to an increase in the percentage of finance mortgage contracts by 77% during the 
first half of 2017 compared to the first half of 2016262. However, with most units available for 
the high-end of the market, it is doubtful that this year’s recent initiative would have a significant 
impact on the affordability of units for the low and middle-income groups. 
               Randy Martin argues that financialization brings together markets that were separate, 
such as banking for consumers or markets for real estate. It asks people from all walks of life to 
welcome risks into their homes and think like capitalists without having enough capital263. 
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Widespread lending in housing markets has become a global establishment. In the United States 
for examples, the large increase in subprime264 lending is currently recognized as “reverse 
redlining”, where individuals who were denied access to credit before are now being “actively 
targeted with new and high-risk credit products”265. 
3.3.2 The real estate investment funds: 
 
                A couple of months before Ramadan of this year, Egyptian roads were suddenly filled 
with billboards promoting a teaser for a campaign titled “Talaat Harb is coming back”. For over 
a month Egyptians on social media kept speculating around the purpose of the ad. While many 
thought it was going to be a drama series about the life of Talaat Harb, others said that the Bank 
of Egypt ‘Bank Misr’ was offering a new saving certificate with a 26% return, leaving people to 
wonder and make fearful assumptions over what that would mean in terms of inflation. With 
speculations reaching their apex, the official campaign was finally released, and it turned out to 
be a promotion for the first ‘real estate investment funds in Egypt’ with a promised return on 
investments of 26%, which is 6% higher than the highest investment certificate in Egyptian 
banks. The new fund would allow investors as well as ordinary citizens to invest in high end 
properties with a high investment return they would otherwise “not have the liquid money to 
invest in”.  Citizens or investors are given the choice to invest in multiple properties instead of 
only one266. 
                 “Egyptians in general are fans of real estate”, explains the executive director of Al 
Naeem Holding which issued the real estate funds, “they consider it as the most secure form of 
investment, which it is”. He continues “we have bought properties with a guaranteed return on 
investments which would make investing in the fund successful ”267 
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             Of course, what they fail to mention is that this leaves people in debt .The increased 
dominance of money and its value has been described as the process of financialization, which 
refers to “the increasing role of financial motives, financial markets, financial actors and 
financial institutions in the operation of the domestic and international economies”.268 
Financialization was strong in effect in the sense that  it extended to the personal lives of the 
population, where people were pushed to stand on their own feet to achieve security by investing 
in personal financial assets269. No longer were savings a security for a rainy day, but rather 
investments270. A house was thus no longer seen as a place to live, but more of a store of 
wealth271. With the proliferation of housing prices, a large percentage of the Egyptian population 
curently has a stake in the stability and certainly the rise of housing prices so as not to lose the 
value of their investments. Housing in Egypt has thus become monetized or ‘propertized’272 
insofar as its citizens operate as investors in economic growth by virtue of the value of their 
homes.  A wide range of everyday cultural practices have become connected to global financial 
networks: pensions, the purchase of houses and consumer goods, the payment of phone and 
credit card bills and most certainly homeownership and mortgages273. The turn to use housing as 
an investment asset enmeshed in a globalized financial market has come to characterize the 
commodification of housing. With policymakers agreeing to propagate housing as a means to 
wealth instead of a social good, the value is generated in the generation of more value, which 
becomes dependent on the speed and number of transactions that would yield an increase in 
value274. Consequently, a culture of borrowing is pushed to become the norm275. 
Horizontal integration has become a characteristic of the globalization of real estate, 
which is seen in the creation of possibilities for new kinds of deals.276 The securitization of the 
real estate market is related to this, which includes a growing range of potential investors, as well 
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as the expansion of the role of intermediary financial institutions such as insurance companies 
and realty asset managers to channel the investment277. The deregulation of the financial industry 
allowed “extra-regional capital markets to more directly affect land development”, where the 
creation of funds such as the real estate investment fund which aims to invest directly into real 
estate projects signals that more and more enterprises are becoming attracted to the profits 
offered by the real estate industry278. 
The takeover of the housing sector by global finance through the ‘socialization of credit’ 
with the push to include low-income consumers into financial circuits, have opened up a new 
avenue for capital accumulation, “allowing the free circulation of values across virtually all 
urban land”. The adoption of neo-liberalism effectively changed the meaning and economic role 
of housing not only in Egypt, but globally as well. A housing paradigm was in action which was 
premised on the making of policies that would create stronger and larger housing-based financial 
markets to include middle and low-income groups279. 
 
Amina, the NGO employee living in Al Shorouk city, currently lives in one of the social 
housing schemes, yet she explains that she applied for a second apartment through mortgage 
financing to serve as a source of investment where she would be able to rent or sell it at a much 
higher price once she is finished with her installments. “When I pay it off I know its price will be 
double the price I bought it with, eventhough the government took more money than what its 
worth, but given the country’s circumstances, any real estate investment is lucrative in the 
future.” Even though Amina describes her investment as a lucrative one, she also at one point 
describes it a source of loss. For her, this source of loss is more psychological than it is material, 
for she constantly feels threatened that the apartment would be taken away from her. The 
housing scheme which Amina is a part of requires that she pays an installment to the bank every 
month. Amina explains that if she is ever late in paying her installments the bank would ring her 
up and threaten to take the apartment and she becomes automatically faced with interests. She 
also adds that government officials would often pass to make sure she is not renting out the 
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apartment or else they would take it from her. Amina sometimes feels that the apartment is a loss 
for her because she is unable to rent it, nor is able to stay in it because of how ill-equipped it is. 
In addition, the apartment she received was not the same size she signed up for, yet she is willing 
to accept it “given the country’s circumstances and given the illogical price hikes”. Amina is 
simply willing to take whatever the government would offer her. “In those terrible times we live 
in, you will find that the level of people’s ambitions lowered like me, I just say it’s good that I 
have the apt, it does not matter where the apt is and if it’s on the fifth floor and I have an illness 
and can’t go up the stairs, it’s really unfair, legally and financially.” 
Amina received an apartment that was different from what was stated in the contract. Despite 
being generally vocal about her demands, Amina stated that she would never file a case against 
the government because she knows they would collaborate against her and take the apartment 
from her, “In Egypt the papers are theirs, the law is theirs, and anything they do will be framed 
as legal, we are not a law country to file a case, they treat their citizens as dogs to throw bones at 
and people would run for it.” In general, Amina states that she does not feel any kind of 
economic or social security in Egypt. Security for her is “at least putting aside some money in 
case anyone is sick, but it’s not really security, it is trying to do what you can do.” 
 
                  The financialization of the everyday practices and the production of the individual as 
a financial subject is the zenith of neoliberalism 280.  The official enactment of the economic 
opening policies in the early nineties characterized by the state’s gradual withdrawal from the 
housing sector and promoting incentives for attracting investors to Egypt’s real estate sector.To 
become responsible for the provision of housing for the middle and upper income groups had 
effectively led to the commodification of Egypt’s land281. Investment directed towards land 
speculation had proven to yield very high returns, that which led to the creation of land scarcity, 
by virtue of its value. A myriad of state policies throughout the years which were inconsistent in 
nature starting from the rigid rent control laws to the sudden complete removal of rent 
restrictions while keeping many of the existing units subject to the former rent laws, coupled by 
the successive privatization of successful public companies that fall in strategic land locations, 
                                                          
280 Anthonio Hardt, Michael Negri, “Empire”, (Harvard University Press, 2000):32 
281 David Harvey (1985):7 
 
 
 
 
59 
 
all characterize the state’s urban policy turn 282. In effect, the pouring of capital into productive 
sectors was replaced with investment in the build environment, and financial success and 
security as a consequence was equated with real estate activity. The neoliberal project had in a 
way “directly institutionalized insecurity”, and has driven the “proliferation of the insecure 
contingent, un-guaranteed, temporary, and informal employment associated with the 
“precariat”283. The project itself used fear as a tool to govern, according to Elaine Campbell in 
“Emotional Life of Govermental Power”, neoliberal subjects are governed to fulfil their potential 
of security, order and stability. This is achieved through mechanisms of fear, and for that to 
change, they need not only think differently, but feel differently. In other words, as long as there 
is fear, and as long as it is felt, it will manifest in the pursuit of security and order. 284 
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Chapter Four 
 
4.1 Understanding the financialization of everyday practices 
 
We cannot look at financialization as a single, univocal logic, “there is multiplication of 
perspectives on the ways in which economic, political, and cultural rationalities are variable, 
heterogeneous, and yet, intertwined.”  
In this chapter, I try to understand the investment subjectivity, and the “cultural 
conditions of possibility imbricated with economic and political factors in complex and often 
contradictory ways”285 through looking at my respondents’ perceptions on why they invest in 
real estate, what role do advertisements play, their perceptions on people who buy and sell 
property for a living, and finally what those working in real estate have to say about the field and 
why they work in it. 
 
4.2 Why do people invest in real estate? 
 
Generally speaking, the prudent purchase of land is a better investment for the ordinary man than 
stocks and bonds, because in the former case he does not pit his judgment against the 
machinations of a board. —Richard T. Ely, 1920286 
 
While most respondents believe that a housing bubble in Egypt would eventually occur, 
they still deemed real estate investment as the most secure. Adel, the salesman from Sodic, was 
the only respondent who did not predict a housing bubble since Egypt does not have a mortgage 
system like the US for example. Adel asserts that there are practically minimal risks involved in 
real estate investments and the biggest risks one could face is being involved with a poor 
developer or not receiving the unit on time or not being provided with amenities like gas and 
electricity (a problem he himself is facing in his compound). yet He concludes that at the end of 
the day real estate investment is a definite win not a loss. 
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“60% of people buy property to live in it, and the other 40% buy to invest”. This was the closest 
to an estimation provided by Adel, who works as a salesman in SODIC Co. for Real Estate 
Development. Accurate figures on the percentage of people who buy for a living as opposed 
investment were not available by other real estate sales or marketers whom I interviewed. Dalia 
who works in Amer Group claims that Porto has its known clientele who purchase to invest, “we 
have a known 100 clients who buy in any Amer project, because they know that what they buy 
today would witness significant value increases after only a few years”. What the sales people 
and marketers I interviewed were certain about however is that “nothing is not sold”. This 
guaranteed profit in the real estate business is what leads to everything being sold. Dalia 
explains, “if he bought it today and sold it a week after he would still make profit even if it is 
little, some people even sell their receipt they placed the down payment with, and would still 
make a profit.” 
 
In Gustav Peebles’s banking accounting he argues that individuals prioritize the 
investment of their money over the hoarding of cash reserves as the rational choice for them 
when thinking of family and public well-being287. Real estate was also the more popular option 
when compared with other forms of investment such as the bank or a project. For only two 
respondents a bank was more favorable than real estate investment. Those two respondents have 
more than two assets as investment sources, yet they state that they would not have placed that 
money in the assets had they not had a primary fixed capital in the bank that for them is the 
source of security because “even if the value for money becomes less, but still it will not go”. A 
common response among my respondents who did actually invest in real estate was “I am not a 
broker, I will only put my money in real estate when I need it, not solely for the sake of 
investment.” One of those respondents is Shaimaa who is a resident of El Mohandesin area, but 
owns in addition a land in OFOK and Rose Valley (compounds at  Cairo’s outskirts), a unit in 
Porto October, a chalet in the North Coast as well as one in Ain Sokhna. I asked Shaimaa about 
the dividing line between her feeling ‘safe’ so she can invest in such a number of properties, and 
not feeling safe so she would put her money in the bank. For her that dividing line was having a 
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large sum of money in the bank or a very easy payment method where she would not need to 
take money out of her main capital. She however concludes that real estate and land are the most 
guaranteed sources of investment and regards her different assets as things that are all for a 
purpose and that are of use aside from being a resale or rental source. “I am not a broker, my 
target is not to buy and sell – but if I have surplus money I will think of real estate, so for 
example I am thinking about getting another apartment in Ain El Sokhna because the one we 
have is a family place, so we need to get some unit of our own, for my daughter, this is an 
investment and I will also make use of it.” 
 
Investing in real estate was often placed in opposition to investing in projects, and among 
many respondents the case for real estate was quite strong particularly because of the failure of 
projects in Egypt. Shaimaa continues, “Investing in projects in Egypt is a failure, because Egypt 
lacks a security system, laws are continuously changing, and there are only a small group of 
people in control, the only secure thing is real estate, not even the stock market, the secure places 
are the banks (the national bank of Egypt) and real estate”  
One of the respondents, Amina, who had been through the experience of investing in a project 
states that if she had surplus money she would never put it in a project because she would not 
want to risk losing as she did in her project before. “I would buy an apartment or my own shop. 
Anything that makes a surplus value even if little but is guaranteed to increase are properties 
even if it’s a room in an apartment.” For most of my respondents however real estate investment 
or investment of any source was contingent upon having surplus money, yet to invest in real 
estate when having surplus money was also the automatic and quite normal response, as if it was 
the obvious thing to do. Peebles argues that investment in a home would always be the more 
appealing choice over a savings account since its return on investment is “deflected to the distant 
future”288. 
Gehad, who is in her mid-twenties and works in a multinational corporation explains, “If I had 
surplus money I would invest in real estate because it is a good investment, and everyone makes 
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money off it, my father had bought a land in the green rope289, and now we can sell it for much 
more.” 
 
Hala who owns a number of feddans in an agriculture land in a rural village has been 
trying to sell it but has not been successful. “I am dying to sell my land to make use of the 20% 
profit in the bank, I am dying to sell it, when the economy improves this rate won’t be there, I 
really hope to make some money to make use of the 20%.” Hala later changes her mind and says 
that if she sells her land she would buy an asset that is “meaningful and of use”.  Hala later in the 
interview decides to factor the safety of the country in the management of her finances. “Going 
after money is not my main concern, because I am proud to be in a country that is not falling 
apart”. Hala’s confusion goes on as she suddenly remembers the meaning of the land and feels 
bad about wanting to sell it  but realizing it is an imperative to be able to afford life’s necessities. 
“The land is a land, a land is not to be sold, you don’t sell agricultural land, this is the heritage 
from your ancestors, by selling it then you are throwing away what they have done for you. But 
because of how expensive things have gotten and because of the increase in responsibilities 
because the country is not the same, people want to wear different things, go to different 
universities, and many want to travel abroad to learn, thus I want to have foreign currency to 
allow my children to live when they travel abroad, schools that were ok ten years ago, are not 
good now”. 
Fadel on the other hand came to Cairo from Tanta to study dentistry, but did not succeed 
so he became a real estate marketer. Fadel now is boasting his private ownership of 20 feddans, 
“My origin is a peasant, the land is my origin, I came from the bottom of society, we had three 
feddans then, and I thought I was the richest man, Egypt (Cairo) to me was the dream back 
then”. 
David Neilson in his account on “class, precarity and anxiety under global 
neoliberalism”, looks at the precariat proletariat whose insecurity stems from the absence of an 
alternative to the insecurity of the wage relation. He argues that “circumstantial precarity” is 
widely increasing in light of the present neo-liberal led global capitalism era, and is allowing a 
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“subjective shift from ontological security towards existential anxiety.”290 Neilson defines 
existential anxiety as a “mental unease induced by the self-reflexive perception of life’s 
precarious character, is intensified by the reality of deepening social and material precarity.”291 
Neilson argues that existential anxiety is an inverse relation to one’s everyday perception of 
stability, predictability and continuity of life or in other words, “ontological security”292.  While 
Hala is desperate to sell her land , Fadel is proud in having bought 20 feddans. Both stories 
however show us that feelings of safety and security in the end boil down to investments in land 
or property. 
 
Mazen, who perceives himself to come from the middle strand of the middle class 
currently lives in a rented apartment and owns an apartment in a gated community on Cairo’s 
outskirts which he regards as his savings, and not as a source of profit making as he is not even 
considering renting it out. For Mazen, investing in real estate was one of several ways to keep his 
money and savings intact. When I asked Mazen if he would attempt to purchase another 
property, his answer was that he maybe would “but this has to do with me not being a 
businessman, I am not an investor looking for investment opportunities, I am looking for a place 
where my money is secure, I will want to make sure that the value does not increase, so I do not 
keep my savings in pounds”. Mazen stated that he as a person feels secure, even though that 
feeling of security was not related to his income. For Mazen, his family whom he described as 
his support system, was his main security pillar. According to him, the family support concept is 
not something that is particular to him, but is something that the “middle class strand typically 
enjoys.” 
 
Based on a housing study of urban Egypt conducted by USAID the main reasons an 
individual would seek a new housing unit are that the individual is getting married (46 %); the 
present unit is too small (16 %); the nuclear family wants to live independently (10 %); the 
person is changing tenure status to ownership (9%), the person is changing tenure status to long-
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term lease (6 %), and other reasons (12%)293. Nowhere in the study is investment mentioned. 
However, the distinction between purchasing a property for living as opposed to investing is not 
always a clear one and can often become blurred. Shaimaa’s family who has purchased a unit in 
Porto October compound explains that her husband had initially bought it with some friends as a 
source of investment. At the time he did not have the money in cash, so he had to take an 
overdraft from the bank. A year ago, he decided to re-buy the unit on his own for his family to 
eventually move there, which according to Shaimaa had always been their plan “because life 
shifts, and this is also related to security, we are not sure if later on we can afford to buy 
something else”. Even though Shaimaa’s family currently owns the house not for investment 
purpose, Shaimaa is aware of its investment potential, where she adds “he bought this unit a year 
ago, but now he can sell it for triple the price, and people are buying with the triple rate.” 
Over the past few decades, consumer-citizens have been called upon to view themselves as 
“investors”, however there remains a “tension at the heart of the investment subjectivity being 
assembled here that blurs the line between household consumption and investment”. 
Consumption too can be viewed as a form of investment and with every act of investment a 
wager on the possible profitability of the future is made, and thus it has become increasingly 
difficult to set it apart from the practice of speculation.294 This ambiguity is exactly what defines 
contemporary homeownership, which is a consumption good just as much as an investment 
asset295. 
 
While most answers reflected my respondents’ view that real estate is the safest sector for 
investment, I ask, how is it safe when in most cases people don’t buy the real estate unit in one 
installment? 
 
“Real estate prices never go down, Egyptians don’t have a commercial sense, 90% of 
businessmen who invest in real estate don’t have a commercial state, the market states that if demand 
decreases prices decrease, but for real estate in Egypt this does not happen. A building in Heliopolis is not 
sold, only one apartment is sold, but still he doesn’t want to decrease the price, this is a certain belief, the 
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concept of waiting it out, they say the apartment does not eat or drink, it does not cost me anything, these 
are Egyptian ideas that are sterile, and they are passed from one generation to the next.” 
 
The second reason is based on Egypt’s economic context, noting the stagnant Egyptian currency, 
which has led many to decide that putting money in an asset is better than nothing at all. Mazen 
for example states that with a worthless currency such as the Egyptian pound, people are 
constantly trying to transform their money into other things where its value would not decrease 
such as real estate, gold, small projects. For him though, real estate became the choice for 
investment. 
While several respondents described the increase in real estate investments as “illogical”, 
particularly when looking at the huge and increasing economic gaps and the percentage of 
citizens below poverty line, they also seem to understand the logic and reasoning behind this 
illogical manner of real estate development. “Nothing is working in Egypt, this is the only sector 
that seems to be working”, explains Shaimaa. She adds, “This is a phenomenon which reflects 
that there is a significant percentage of Egyptians who do not know where to place their money.” 
David Harvey links capital accumulation to the structure of urban land markets. He explains that 
the commodification of space is perpetuated through the flow of “productive capital” into a 
spatial fix for capitalist crisis, which is real-estate investment- that which forces space to become 
a source of accumulation rather than allow place to function as a source of living296. Shaimaa 
continues, “My point of view is that people have too much money and do not know what to do 
with it, and those people are the ones who used to open factories, produce for the country, and 
now they cannot because of the country’s status, so they invest in real estate, So for example, 
there is someone in Porto who bought 10 villas next to each other, 10 villas, and he is not even 
famous, he just has a lot of money, of course for him to buy that it must mean that he has more 
money in the bank.” 
 
Egypt’s economic and spatial development has been mostly construction-led, with 
projects in many cases replacing policies297.Investment is tied to the simultaneous achievement 
of personal and economic growth, both of which are inseparable in the actions of subjects who 
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actively create opportunities for their own self-care, security and personal responsibility. Rather 
than moral bankruptcy or irrational herd-like behavior, ‘investment appears as the most rational 
form of saving.298” Foucault argues that financialization goes beyond constituting a set of 
activities which are tied to global capital markets, but it is also an “ontological question of what 
it means to be human and can be seen as a mode of subjectification and a technology of the 
self”299.  Risk accordingly becomes a way of life and invites a kind of being and goes beyond 
making a calculation or a way of knowing300.  
 
4.3 The role of advertisements 
 
Real estate advertisements in the past few years have played a major role not only in 
widening the societal gap through provoking millions of Egyptians who are unable to afford a 
single installment of the advertised units, let alone an entire housing scheme, but more 
significantly on capitalizing on the idea of home ownership as synonymous with secure 
investment and trading amongst citizens. A tagline for a campaign for a residential compound in 
6th of October reads, “Because not anyone is allowed to live in Life Park, we interview people 
before they can move in.” In another ad for a compound in Ras Sudr, the tagline reads, “Life is 
so much better when you find people like you”, where “like you” indicates socio-economic level, 
which has become the selling point of most real estate ads301. 
“If the price of a unit is good and we are able to sell it to him, a man can literally sell his wife’s 
gold to buy it”- Dalia, Amer Group. 
 
Such a statement in addition to reflecting desperate measures which could be undertaken 
to own a house in one of the new housing schemes, also reflects the power and authority held by 
the developing company over a client. The marketer here is certain that a client can and would go 
out of their way to buy if the company is able to sell the unit right. The marketing factor hence 
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becomes a key factor contributing to the decision to invest in real estate. With a dedication to 
seducing citizens to direct their focus towards visions of ‘Westernization’ and ‘modernity’ 
through their promotional material, real estate marketers have become widely successful in “re-
shaping one’s spatial perception of the urban cityscape”302. Such a perception was strongly 
adopted by Dalia who attributes the decision to buy or invest in a property primarily to the 
success of the marketing campaign. When I asked her why she thought a man would sell his 
wife’s gold to buy a unit, her answer was the ad tagline, “because the ad said: your chalet is your 
project , Porto will rent out your chalet for you and provide you with a monthly revenue. It made 
him feel that if you buy this unit I will secure your future for you.”  Dalia emphasizes that the 
marketing campaign is what matters at the end of the day. Developers are able to identify what 
appeals to consumers the most and accordingly design the ads through manipulating this 
knowledge for the maximum benefit303. 
“We tell him that we will sell him a lifestyle, a place where you would not need to leave, all 
services included, everything is walking distance from your home, this is how we sell”- Dalia 
                 Mazen, also points out to the marketing factor as an instrumental one in the decision 
to buy. He describes the marketing of the new housing schemes as one that is “classist”, and 
regards this classist way of advertising as actually what sells the units. “This classist marketing 
gives the buyer/investor a message that he would be living amongst a certain social class, that he 
would be treated in a certain way, that he would have services the government itself does not 
give its citizens such as private security.” In a study conducted on the role of advertisements in 
the marketing of new gated communities in Cairo, significant emphasis was placed on how 
wittingly developers promote their commodity where, “they do not sell a house, but an entirely 
new life-style”, where the communal nature and the high prospects of finding like-minded and 
same class friends in the compound is strongly marketed304. 
 
Dalia mentions that in Porto they launched a campaign that was titled, ‘your installment 
starts at 3000 LE’-  “people came like retards to buy, I am not kidding”, she explains, “if he had 
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calculated it he would have realized that offering the installment for 3K means that I am taking 
interest, not because I am telling him I am not hoarding interests then I am not really taking 
interest, he is a retard and believed that it was that cheap, I am taking the price of the unit in the 
first two years, the rest is merely interests that you are paying off- the whole idea is about the 
number you tell your clients. “ 
In addition to “selling a life style”, Porto also plays the investment card, where some of their 
projects have investment potential as their market edge, which they capitalize on. Dalia gives an 
example of a project they have in front of the American University in New Cairo, “We told the 
client, buy the apartment and I as Porto will rent it for you and will give you 80% of the rental 
value, and those who bought it for a million, today will sell it for 2.5 million.” 
                When I went to visit the cityscape convention, an annual happening which features the 
bulk of Egypt’s real estate developers while marketing their projects, I expressed hypothetical 
interest in one of the compounds which went by the name Pyramid Hills. The salesman was keen 
on communicating the following details to me in his presentation: 
“We have a contract with Gourmet the Supermarket, but we are still not sure” 
“Sawiris’s house is inside- he comes two times a week” 
“We don’t allow anyone to live inside the compound, the social standard is of extreme 
importance- the community must blend in together” 
“We go through a screening process to ensure a certain standard is maintained” 
“The condos start from 4 mm” 
Me: “Are there any cheaper?” 
Man: “Yes, but they don’t have a pyramid view- they are for the people who simply want to exist 
inside the compound.” 
 
Pervasive lifestyle media and consumer cultures is underpinned by an investment logic 
which not only promises future beneficial rewards, but also the “prospect of pleasure through 
returns”305. In the everyday spaces of society, individuals are pushed to take control over their 
own economic lives and equip themselves with entrepreneurial capacities that would allow them 
to take rational decisions for “selling their homes as assets, and source of income for 
consumption”306, and lifestyle media plays an increasingly crucial role in this process. Akhil 
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Gupta argues that representations of the state are constituted, contested and transformed in public 
culture. Mass media thus becomes one of the mechanisms of public culture which brings about 
the visible practices of institutions such as the state. I argue that the marketing and advertisement 
of gated communities in Egypt act as an embodiment of the transfiguration of the neoliberal state 
and its withdrawal from its welfare duties, namely its role to provide decent and adequate 
housing. 
 
“I feel disgusted and I just change the channel automatically, for an ad to be successful it 
shouldn’t make me feel disgusted about my life, I sit in public transport all day long and you 
come and tell me that my life sucks portray the city as a monster and tell me to live in mountain 
view, the ad tells that the word is lovely and pink and to come and buy and I don’t even have the 
money to walk to the end of the street, they are really provocative, they need to create channels to 
this certain particular niche and should lock them so that we don’t see them, just like they gate 
their communities, we don’t want to see them (laughs), we just want to leave this country.” 
 
             With the bombardment from the media, the ease of bank loans, the advertisement 
industry, the rural dreams of ownership and the absence of the role of the state, the responsibility 
is put on the citizen and not on the state to pursue a good life. The state here exempts itself from 
any responsibilities to provide adequate housing and through the intermarriage of the state and 
private interests, the dream is sold but with a price tag. You can live that life too if you take an 
overdraft from the bank and put yourself in debt. In 1991 in Egypt with the advent of structural 
adjustment programs, a new form of “human rights” came to existence and that is the right of 
“credit” and the right to be in debt. Instead of finding solutions through welfare, better legislation 
or actual development, development schemes focused on programs that give “credit” for people 
to own a home, start a project among other ideas under the umbrella of empowering the poor, 
however what this does is put the responsibility of “the good life”, the “home” and “security” in 
the lap of the private citizen. Lifestyle consumer culture has become a “quintessential technology 
of advanced or neoliberal citizenship”307, where the citizen feels obliged to be privately 
empowered in facing a deregulated economy. This manifest the paradox of security of investing 
and home ownership while simultaneously being constantly in debt. 
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             The global trend towards the commodification of housing has greatly affected the 
enjoyment of right to adequate housing. The focus on speculative investments in prime 
locations in city centers and the construction of high-end gated communities on the 
outskirts of Cairo immensely affected the affordability of housing. Further, the 
integration of the housing market within the ‘general circuits of finance’ have meant the 
presence of competition between multinational corporations and individuals over land 
locations, whose outcome is probably known308. The proliferation of gated communities 
or ‘enclaves’ to house the upper middle and upper groups is the natural consequence, 
while conversely pushing those who are unable to afford even social housing which in 
most cases is far from their livelihoods, and lacks or has poor basic services. Looking at 
Cairo’s top-down model of urban growth -which failed to engage with Cairo’s actual 
growth patterns exemplified in the new desert cities and which culminated into the luxury 
gated communities model- has become diagnostic of how Cairo’s citizens were actively 
denied full urban citizenship.309  The expansion of Cairo’s outskirts and the new gated 
communities which offer its inhabitants promises of beautiful scenery and greenery as 
well as good services and decent roads, has been complemented by the deterioration of 
basic services in the city itself- including sewage, water, garbage and road maintenance. 
Amina, narrates her feelings towards the shape of urban Cairo, where she describes the 
building of the new cities leading to the ghettoization of urban Cairo, which has effectively 
become divided between the gated communities and the ‘ghettos’. “Every once in a while you 
would see this ghetto where the rest of the people reside and are looked upon as the dogs who are 
too low to go inside those gated communities, those communities are for the rich, and if you go 
inside any of those compounds you will find the apartments empty”. (Amina) 
Dorman proposes that we look at Cairo’s trajectory in a context of a resiliently 
authoritarian political order, where its planning ethos was largely aimed at fulfilling the 
increasing state capacity more than the privatization of public assets and institutions ever 
did310. Amina lives in one of the social housing projects. Before living in the apartment 
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there were squatters in her apartment. When I asked her why she thought the squatters 
inhabited her apartment instead of the empty villas , her answer was, “those who own those 
villas are supported by the state - but our apartments are government apartments and are usually 
inhabited by government men - when you would pass by one of al Rasheedy’s311 villas you 
would hear his dogs and go running”. 
Cairo’s urban logic should then be associated with an exclusionary nature of 
formal sector urbanism, which was visible in the Nasserite era, well before Egypt’s 
economic opening in the late 1970s312. Mazen, a human rights lawyer, gives a picture of 
Dorman’s theorization, “there was this phase/stage that we dubbed as the plastic phase; where 
we referred to the luxury buildings particularly the architecturally unique ones to be licit to the 
businessmen to do whatever they wanted with them. It is very easy for you to close your eyes 
and open them to find those buildings torn down and replaced by ugly towers, in Egypt we suffer 
from architectural ugliness, and this says that the state does not care about what the country 
looks like. If you go towards the outskirts, there is a case of ugliness that is illogical, and it has to 
do with poverty and the fact that it is a loose state that only cares about political security, a tower 
of 13 floors that can fall the next day is less important than three guys protesting unemployment 
in the streets. It doesn’t matter the shape, not the security, nor the height, nor the laws, nor the 
lives of the people, what matters is getting the most money we can- making use of how poor the 
people are and the easy terms of payment we offer them.” Mazen compares the low-income on 
the outskirts to the high-income on the outskirts, where he refers in particular to the architecture 
of the high-income housing as “nice architecture”, yet what he alludes to is that a distinction is 
created between the different classes in the architectural style in which they are allowed to live. 
“Who has money will live in a fancy nice-looking place, and who doesn’t have the money will 
live and die in an ugly place”. “Without government regulation”, he adds, “it becomes easy to 
get a land and even easier to build in whatever way anyone wants”. He then concludes, “the 
capital will not think about how to accommodate to your needs, the most important thing is 
making money.” Dalia, who works as a marketer in Amer Group explains that there is no 
regulation from the government on what developers do, “everyone builds what he wants the way 
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he wants it, no rules or regulations”. She continues that even the ads for the compound lack 
regulation and monitoring and everything is done with ‘kosa’ or bribery, “I can do an advertising 
for porto ‘chicken’ and there would be nothing of the sort.” Nonetheless, Dalia explains that 
even though everyone works legally for the government, everything ends up happening under the 
table indicting the potential for indecent action and twisted ways to finish off things. 
 
The production and consumption of security commodities such as luxury housing in 
gated communities in addition to creating aesthetically ‘pretty’ spaces of consumption for upper 
middle and high-class residents, also created spatial dynamics of exclusion giving rise to new 
forms of ‘consumer citizenship’ and identity politics313.  Caldeira, in her account of walling and 
segregation in Sao Paulo, talks about the gated communities where she describes them as 
“fortified enclaves”314. She talks about how those enclaves have effectively altered the “city’s 
landscape, patterns of spatial segregation and the character of public space and public class 
interaction.”315 The following is an excerpt of Caldeira’s description of the ‘enclave’: 
They are physically demarcated and isolated by walls, fences, empty spaces, and design devices. 
They are turned inward, away from the street, whose public life they explicitly reject. They are 
controlled by armed guards and security systems, which enforce rules of inclusion and exclusion. 
They are flexible: because of their size, the new technologies of communication, the new 
organization of work, and security systems, they constitute autonomous spaces, independent of 
their surroundings, that can be situated almost anywhere. As a consequence, although they tend to 
be spaces for the upper classes, they may be sited in rural areas or on the old periphery, beside 
favelas or auto constructed houses. Finally, the enclaves tend to be socially homogeneous 
environments. People who choose to inhabit these spaces value living among selected people 
(considered to be of the same social group) and away from the undesired interactions, movement, 
heterogeneity, danger, and the unpredictability of open streets316.  
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Citizenship entauls rights (civil, political, social, sexual,cultural) and obligations a citizen 
has in relation to the state,317 the state and the citizen has both rights and obligations. Engin Isin 
expands the definition of the active citizen in which there are different sites and scales in which 
citizenship can be practiced and negotiated. In this context ,citizenry is not a right but a luxury 
afforded to those who buy their way into it. The pursuit of a good life is not just living with 
green spaces, but also in having a say in neighborhood affairs. In having your voice heard by the 
company, in having an opinion to what color the pavement will be painted and what decisions 
the home owners will take. Practicing your basic right as a citizen in the city of Cairo is thus only 
possible when you quite literally buy your way into it. 
In her critique of the current democratic theory in tackling the citizenship question, 
Chantal Mouffe argues that the conception of individuals as ‘utility maximizing agents’ or 
‘rational subjects’, has encouraged the privatization of life through discouraging the active 
involvement of citizens in polity engagement. She argues that contrary to the announced secured 
stability as an outcome of this conception, what resulted was “extreme forms of individualism 
which threaten the very social fabric”318. She concludes that as a response, may would look for 
different forms of collective identification, which can jeopardize the “civic bond that should 
unite a democratic political association.319. Here, we can think of practices of accumulation as 
not just contributing to inequality, but how they are related to democracy. 
Gamila, one of my respondents who works as a tour guide and resides in Al Agouza district, 
talks about how Cairo’s urban policy is led by a mafia and network of interests, “urban planning 
is not even there, because it is not in the mafia’s interest. Their interest lies in having the 
concrete expansion go on, and we are all paying its price, the people who inhabit the city are 
suffocating, and economically it is a disaster because the market is unregulated so there is no 
way of knowing the price in the supplied market, it is fixed money in cement, so economically, 
and aesthetically and investment-wise we have failed.” 
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Central to the citizenship factor and the exclusion of citizens is the promotion of 
consumer markets and particularly the housing commodification and consumerization led by the 
economic liberalization policies are their marketing and advertisement agents The proliferation 
of television advertisements and outdoor ads for gated communities which aim to seduce people 
to embrace this “new life” plays on the people’s fantasies and sensibilities and hence their 
desires320.  The ‘economy of anticipation’ which we live in entangle orientations to the future, 
and shapes “relationships of power, consent and struggle”.321 The liberalization of the housing 
sector has led to an “abundance of futures”, which creates spaces for the mobilization of hopes 
and doubts. Large infrastructure projects such as gated communities and new cities makes for 
new ways of “knowing about, imagining and living toward the near and distant future which 
converge with particular intensity”322. 
“You can live a good life in Egypt but unfortunately you need to be very rich to afford living in 
Zamalek or one of the new compounds”, narrates Hoda, an Egyptian-German citizen who had 
told me about her suffering in navigating the streets of Cairo. Hoda currently lives in a 
prestigious area in Mohandesin, an upper middle class neighborhood, yet she tells me that she is 
severely unhappy and wishes to move away. 
 
 
4.4 Perceptions on those who buy and sell for a living 
 
“My point of view is that people have too much money and do not know what to do with it, and 
those people are the ones who used to open factories, produce for the country, and now they cannot 
because of the country’s status, so they invest in real estate”. 
 
When respondents were asked about their perceptions about people who buy and sell for 
a living or in other words, the speculators, most of them said that objectively they have a 
problem with the concept, but that it is nonetheless understandable and reasonable in light of the 
country’s context. In an article on the economy of speculation, Jorge Nunez suggests that the 
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“clinical economy of speculation” which he links to the onset of credit and debt based 
economies, has now become extended to the general population323. In his article he argues that 
the common speculative practices in Spain were viewed as risky and unsafe when they were 
performed by people instead of banks324. In Egypt, those common speculative practices have 
become normalized as a way of adapting and responding to the workings of the economy and the 
government’s housing policies. 
 
“My uncle had a mall 10-15 years ago that wasn’t that expensive to build, now he sells the shop 
for a million pounds, why a million, why all of this, what did he do to earn it?” (Amina) 
 
Despite Amina’s complaining of the unfairness of the property market in Egypt which 
she illustrated with her uncle’s example, she realizes it is not her uncle’s fault and that in the end 
it is a projection by those in control of the market price. 
 
“As I was telling you about my uncle, he does not deserve it, but he does deserve it given the law 
of the country, those are the market prices, this is capitalist market, but at the same time it is run by the 
government, so only the witty ones are the ones who can get by during this time, but who is walking by 
the wall will be eaten alive. I have an aunt who bought lands on the outskirts of Madinet Nasr, the next 
day the land was legalized, and she sold it 4 times the price she bought with, so she sold to buy other 
pieces of land, but she had known that they would be legalized. That is the market or the place for the 
shrewd, that is the capitalist market and unfortunately the government is running it.” 
 
Notwithstanding Amina’s belief that living and profiting and selling contributes to a 
government-made black market and would contribute to inequality, she also states that given the 
opportunity she would do the same, “not because I want to participate in it, but because this is 
what my social circumstances would dictate, I need to have money to treat my brother and 
mother, change my car, I need to get my mother an air-conditioned car.” Amina adds, “why 
would I would work hard in this country? This is not a country where your work would pay off, 
now for example the work I do I would receive more than double what I get if I work it 
elsewhere. This is not a country that prompts people to work and improve his talents and 
capabilities, the society is now a capitalist market, run over your son to move up the ladder, this 
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is what everyone is doing now, so for example if my uncle sees a piece of land with a good price 
that he knows would be good for me, he would keep it to himself, so even the people changed 
with each other, and these are the ordinary people so what do you think would happen with the 
big guys.” 
 
Hala, however expressed no understanding of the stance of speculators and expressed 
how problematic this phenomenon was for her. “People don’t want to make an effort, they want 
to find ready made money, this is a crisis that fell upon the country, no production, this is the 
main reason the economy fell as it does not promote the country’s productivity. I wish to see 
people invest their money in factories that produce like in the old days before nationalization; we 
have nothing, we import everything, our country would be different if the youth’s energies were 
placed in useful things.” When I asked Hala if she thought people were justified to do that, she 
gave a clear no for an answer and described them as “selfish”. However she continued saying 
“but the wrong policies led them to become like this” 
When I asked her what would she do if she had millions to invest, she said that she would open 
up a factory if she could, however she continues by saying, “but people are complaining about 
Egyptian labor.” 
 
Hala,who has previously stated that she isn’t after money because it is more important to 
be in a country that is safe, finds her instinct telling her to place blame on the people. However 
we find her answers often contradicting this blame, such as “but the policies” and “but the 
Egyptian labor are…” 
Gehad, one of the respondents finds no problem whatsoever in the work of speculators, 
and for her it is regarded as completely normal, “Why not? It’s not wrong. I buy a house with a 
long-term vision that it will increase in value and when it’s a good time I sell it.” 
In his work on speculative accumulation in South Africa, Detlev Krige looks at how gambling 
which has for long been regarded as a business and livelihood strategy for those living at the 
margins of state under apartheid, has now come to occupy an integral position in the system’s 
inner workings and how financial capitalism works through what he dubs “making money with 
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money”.325 The Comaroffs describe the new forms of speculation and financial risk as crucial to 
the growth of finance capitalism where, “It has been routinized in a wide-spread infatuation with, 
and popular participation in, high-risk dealings in stocks, bonds, and funds whose fortunes are 
governed largely by chance”326. 
 
Fiona Allon argues that instead of looking at the financial crisis in terms of financial 
excess, speculation and fraud, there is a need to reflect on the crisis as one that is cultural, by  
looking at how the practices of investment and calculation within everyday life have become 
normalized327. This normalization is reflected in the creation of the ‘citizen-speculator’ figure, 
who is now expected to look at housing as an object of speculation and a site of accumulation 
that would provide future welfare instead of present debt328. Again, with the growing calls for 
individuals to secure their livelihoods and independence through financial markets rather than 
through the state, practices of investment and speculation have become normalized instead of 
being associated with financial distortion329. 
 
4.5 On working in the real estate business 
 
“The most important thing is money then money then money” – Adel, salesperson from 
SODIC330. Upon graduating from political science in a reputable university, Adel decided to 
make real estate sales as his long term career after an unhappy three months working at Egypt’s 
Central Bank, and because of how lucrative it is to work in real estate. We as sales are the most 
important component in the company, we have input in the company’s strategy, as the 
company’s capital is its sales, the people in other departments are unable to talk to us because 
they realize we are above them”. Adel explains the brutality of the selection process for an 
infamous company like SODIC.  He goes on, “when I went for an interview they gave me a 
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piece of paper and told me to write down the names of all the people I knew, and then they 
would compare it the lists of people employed, if they found common names they would not hire 
me”. 
Such brutality becomes even more apparent after one is hired, where a person’s 
employment becomes contingent upon the sales target. “If you don’t achieve your sales target 
you are put on probation and if you do not improve you are automatically fired”. In such a crazy 
competitive environment where colleagues often steal clients from one another, since their lives 
are dependent on making a sale, their employment is not alone in being dependent on making a 
sale, but their social life as well. Adel explains, “If you are a successful salesman, everyone in 
the company loves you, but if your ratings go down, they would dislike you overnight.” 
When I first talked to Fadel, the broker, I noticed he would insist I would call him Dr. 
Fadel. I later learnt from him that he had graduated from the School of Medicine, but had 
decided to leave the entire career to work in the real estate business instead. “Life conditions 
were hard, wages were very low, particularly in the past, it was very hard to get somewhere, it 
was a conscious decision for me to get into real estate marketing, we wanted to make a living, 
my friends and I decided, we wanted marketing”. Fadel has been owner of his real estate 
marketing company for 30 years now. His business grew quite successful even though Fadel 
admits to never studying marketing. Fadel explains that almost 10% of his class never pursued a 
medical career and adopted business careers instead. He recalls his experience as an excited 
medical student who is new to Cairo, “When I went to Cairo to apply for dentistry I took a cab 
and I knew nothing about Cairo, I was excited that I was going to be let go from the manual 
work and start working from theory, but mind you, graduation is the rock that breaks 90% of the 
youth’s backs if they are not supported by their families, I don’t leave my son now, when I 
graduated my wage was EGP 90, I couldn’t live or cope with the needs of life .” 
The transformation of waged-workers into “the active entrepreneur” is a result of the 
flexibilization of the employment relation. Standing points to the rise of a new group of 
‘proficians’ who are leading small and medium knowledge-based capitalist firms and who were 
initially locate amongst knowledge-worker turned entrepreneurs331, where again the 
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responsibility of the pursuit of a good life is placed on the “business owner”, the “flexible 
worker” and not the waged employee. Foucault refers to the homo oeconomicus as a figure that 
reappeared powerfully within neoliberalism, but instead of being a “partner of exchange”, “he is 
an entrepreneur, an entrepreneur of himself332.” 
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Chapter FIVE 
5.1 Conclusion 
 
                 In Egypt, it is difficult not to notice the pervasive power of the real estate industry. In 
almost every street and highway, you would have to bump into a fancy looking advertisement 
that promises you a happier life with better prospects for almost every aspect of life. Not only is 
the real estate industry pervasive through the advertisements and marketing campaigns, but its 
pervasions has extended to our personal aspirations, dreams and fears in our daily lives. With 
gated communities on Cairo’s outskirt developing at an accelerating rate, and Cairo’s capital 
deteriorating at an even faster rate, the hope of moving to one of those ‘dream’ communities is 
certainly becoming more real and more hitting home. My interest in this research was triggered 
by observing those everyday questions, conversations, hopes and fears. In almost any family 
gathering, real estate investment would be one of the main topics on the table, where family 
members would compare offers from different developers to see who has the best deal and future 
investment potential. Arguments would also arise over selling family inherited lands in order to 
place the money in a better investment opportunity in a project on the outskirts of Cairo or in 
Egypt’s North Coast. I think the power and impact of the industry hit me the most when I was 
celebrating a friend’s 24th birthday party at her house, only to find the main conversation in the 
party to circulate around real estate investment and where the best spots to invest are. Friends of 
my friend who were in their early twenties and who were not related to the industry through 
direct employment seemed to know the details of the industry, the trends of property increase, 
and offered each other advice on cheap land to invest in that they ‘expected’ would increase in 
the future. The ongoing conversation was divided between people who lived in Western Cairo 
and those who lived in the East, with each party defending their territory and its ‘new cities’ (6th 
of October in the West, and New Cairo in the East). I felt it to be an extremely eerie conversation 
to be had only to realize that it has become a natural concern and embodiment of our everyday 
lives. 
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                   What I aimed to investigate in this research was how such a concern has become 
naturalized and how it has come to hold an integral position in our lives, and how in effect does 
this extend to the making of today’s subjects. I started off by looking at the legal framework in 
place from the 1950s until the present, which was characterized by inconsistent policies that put 
in place a succession of rigid control rents that eventually prompted people to rent out their units 
causing a housing shortage for low and middle-income groups. With the enactment of economic 
liberalization policies in the early 1990s, rent restrictions were removed and the state withdrew 
its support from middle and upper income housing leaving it at the hands of private developers. I 
then look at the political roots of land speculation where I focus on how the military’s hoarding 
of most of Egypt’s lands since the 1967 war was a source of wealth and power for them. In 
addition, with the realization of the potential of land for speculative investment and the high 
returns it brings, private investors were also competing over strategic land locations to be used in 
speculative purposes or for investments in the build environment. In general land speculative 
investments contributed to the aggrandizement of the elites since the 1970s333. I maintain that 
contrary to what is suggested to be the effect of neo-liberal policies on the retraction of 
the state in favor of the market, the state was never absent from intervening in the 
housing policies, where it instead played a central role in the process of commodification 
and financialization of housing, in effect maintaining the neo-liberal dominance334. While 
Harvey describes the accumulation of capital through investing in the buil t environment 
as a form of fictitious capital, the resulting precariousness of the housing conditions and 
the homelessness and damage which actually occurred to the lives of the people suggest 
that such capital is not at all fictitious but very real in practice 335. Interviews with private 
property developers showed the state to be holding a tight grip more than ever, with 
developers complaining of land scarcity to have resulted from the state being the sole 
land controller and deciding to offer land to investors at over-market prices which as 
stated by the largest real estate developers gives them no chance to accommodate to the 
middle-income housing. 
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                 In the third chapter I look at the economics behind the real estate market, 
through looking at the global role played by the banks in financing real estate and in the 
commodification of housing. I then look at the banking sector in Egypt and how at the 
onset of the liberalization of the banking sector, access to credit was offered primarily to 
figures who were politically “well connected” which effectively denied other 
‘entrepreneurs’ in developing their private businesses. The access to credit enjoyed by the 
‘elites’ allowed them to establish investment banks directed at the investment of real 
estate. In the last part of the chapter, I claim that citizens are being called to “include” 
themselves in the country’s financial market, either through credit cards, real estate 
investment funds or finance mortgage schemes.  I attempt to look at the spatial dynamics 
of exclusion and the expansion of private property which resulted from the 
commodification of housing, and which are embodied in the ever-increasing gated 
communities on the outskirts of Cairo. I once again look at the role of marketing in 
triggering the material and symbolic desire for purchasing a property, which plays on the 
whims and imaginations of citizens through shiny promises of a better life. However, to 
achieve this better life and services entitled to any citizen, you need to buy your way into 
this citizenship, where respondents perceive that living in a gated community would give 
them this semblance of citizenship whether by achieving a basic right such as ‘security’ 
or an economic right such as the right to take a loan. Again, while this ‘enclavizaion’ 
may provide this feeling of security for its inhabitants, there emerges a relational feeling 
of insecurity in the rest of the city, who would to be at a disadvantage for not having the 
material and symbolic benefits granted automatically by virtue of being a citizen in one 
of Cairo’s new housing schemes.  While  material benefits include better material services 
such as infrastructure, sewage, roads, etc…, symbolic benefits extends to the feeling of 
security and alleviation of uncertainty. 
            In the fourth chapter I talk about perceptions of middle and upper middle-class 
citizens towards property ownership and real estate investment  and why they themselves 
invest in real estate. In general respondents stated that investing in real estate was the 
most secure form of investment for them which they would prefer over the placing their 
money in the banks or in projects. Some respondents in particular expressed their 
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opposition towards investing money in projects due to failed experience with projects 
themselves. In fact, they argue that most capital of real estate companies used to be 
directed to factories (productive sectors) before becoming hindered by the socio-
economic policies in place. I attempt to show the paradoxical nature of the concept of 
buying for the achievement of security, for through buying you achieve the dream of 
homeownership, but you are also constantly in debt. I look as well at the role of the 
marketing industry in the production of the feeling of the ‘need for security’ through 
ownership, as well as how marketing campaigns are now directly playing on the 
investment desire through promoting their home projects as projects for the citizens to 
invest in. Most respondents seemed to be aware and cognizant of the country’s economic 
context and in return their conscious decisions to place in real estate instead of any other 
sector. I argue that the trust in the real estate sector was manifested the most during years 
of the revolution, which unlike other sectors which were severely hampered, real estate 
was not only unaffected but also witnessing incredible increase in investment and thus 
expansion. Hence through my interviews with my respondents I try to show how through 
looking at a sector like real estate and the play on the individual’s imaginative real 
through the marketing industry, one can understand more about the making of the 
neoliberal subject and the ways through which he becomes responsible for one’s self to 
achieve his own security.  
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